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Abstract 
[Excerpt] I am pleased to submit this Semiannual Report to Congress, which highlights the most 
significant activities and accomplishments of the Department of Labor (DOL), Office of Inspector General 
(OIG), for the six-month period ending March 31, 2008. During this reporting period, our investigative work 
led to 406 indictments, 253 convictions, and $32 million in monetary accomplishments. In addition, we 
issued 41 audits and other reports and questioned $181.4 million in costs. 
OIG audits continue to disclose a pattern of weakness in the Mine Safety and Health Administration’s 
(MSHA’s) oversight in DOL’s programs to ensure miner safety. For example, we found that MSHA failed to 
conduct all required safety inspections at 107 underground coal mines where approximately 7,500 miners 
worked. Furthermore, an OIG audit of MSHA’s review and approval of the roof control plan at Utah’s 
Crandall Canyon Mine found that MSHA did not have a rigorous, transparent review and approval process 
for roof control plans and could not show that its process was free from undue influence by the mine 
operator. 
We also identified problems in the Department’s grant management. An OIG audit found that DOL non- 
competitively awarded 133 high growth job training grants, totaling $235 million. The Department could 
not demonstrate that it followed proper procedures in awarding 35, or 90 percent, of the high growth 
grants we reviewed, totaling $57 million. An OIG audit of a $32.5 million earmark grant to provide 
employment services overstated the number of participants in the program and could not demonstrate 
that participants received employment services funded by the grant. We questioned more than $11 
million in inappropriate costs charged to that grant. 
Our investigations continue to combat labor racketeering involving the monies in union-sponsored benefit 
plans, internal union affairs, and labor-management relations. A major OIG organized crime investigation 
led to the high-profile indictments of 62 members and associates of the Gambino Organized Crime Family 
on charges that included racketeering conspiracy, theft of union benefits, loan sharking, and murder 
conspiracy. Both construction industry and union officials were among those charged for crimes 
spanning more than three decades. 
We continue to investigate instances of corruption in which officers of labor organizations embezzle 
money from union and member benefit plan accounts and defraud members of their right to honest 
services. An OIG investigation led to the guilty plea of a former New York State assemblyman who also 
served as a high-ranking union official. The defendant admitted to 21 specific acts of racketeering and 
pleaded guilty to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) forfeiture. 
OIG investigations revealed that the foreign labor certification process continues to be compromised by 
unscrupulous attorneys, labor brokers, employers, and others. In one case, four conspirators who 
operated a labor leasing company were sentenced to jail and a $1 million judgment for their roles in 
providing fraudulent documentation that enabled more than 200 foreign nationals to illegally enter the 
United States. We will continue to work with the Department to safeguard the integrity of the foreign labor 
certification process. 
The OIG remains committed to promoting the economy, integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency of DOL. I 
would like to express my sincere gratitude to a professional and dedicated OIG staff for its significant 
achievements during this reporting period. 
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 A MESSAGE FROM 
 THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
I am pleased to submit this Semiannual Report to Congress, which highlights the most signifi cant 
activities and accomplishments of the Department of Labor (DOL), Offi ce of Inspector General (OIG), 
for the six-month period ending March 31, 2008. During this reporting period, our investigative work 
led to 406 indictments, 253 convictions, and $32 million in monetary accomplishments. In addition, we 
issued 41 audits and other reports and questioned $181.4 million in costs.
OIG audits continue to disclose a pattern of weakness in the Mine Safety and Health Administration’s 
(MSHA’s) oversight in DOL’s programs to ensure miner safety. For example, we found that MSHA 
failed to conduct all required safety inspections at 107 underground coal mines where approximately 
7,500 miners worked. Furthermore, an OIG audit of MSHA’s review and approval of the roof control 
plan at Utah’s Crandall Canyon Mine found that MSHA did not have a rigorous, transparent review 
and approval process for roof control plans and could not show that its process was free from undue 
infl uence by the mine operator.
We also identifi ed problems in the Department’s grant management. An OIG audit found that DOL non-
competitively awarded 133 high growth job training grants, totaling $235 million. The Department could 
not demonstrate that it followed proper procedures in awarding 35, or 90 percent, of the high growth 
grants we reviewed, totaling $57 million. An OIG audit of a $32.5 million earmark grant to provide 
employment services overstated the number of participants in the program and could not demonstrate 
that participants received employment services funded by the grant. We questioned more than 
$11 million in inappropriate costs charged to that grant. 
Our investigations continue to combat labor racketeering involving the monies in union-sponsored 
benefi t plans, internal union affairs, and labor-management relations. A major OIG organized crime 
investigation led to the high-profi le indictments of 62 members and associates of the Gambino 
Organized Crime Family on charges that included racketeering conspiracy, theft of union benefi ts, loan 
sharking, and murder conspiracy. Both construction industry and union offi cials were among those 
charged for crimes spanning more than three decades.
We continue to investigate instances of corruption in which offi cers of labor organizations embezzle 
money from union and member benefi t plan accounts and defraud members of their right to honest 
services. An OIG investigation led to the guilty plea of a former New York State assemblyman who also 
served as a high-ranking union offi cial. The defendant admitted to 21 specifi c acts of racketeering and 
pleaded guilty to Racketeer Infl uenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) forfeiture.
OIG investigations revealed that the foreign labor certifi cation process continues to be compromised 
by unscrupulous attorneys, labor brokers, employers, and others. In one case, four conspirators who 
operated a labor leasing company were sentenced to jail and a $1 million judgment for their roles in 
providing fraudulent documentation that enabled more than 200 foreign nationals to illegally enter the 
United States. We will continue to work with the Department to safeguard the integrity of the foreign 
labor certifi cation process.
The OIG remains committed to promoting the economy, integrity, effectiveness, and effi ciency of DOL. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to a professional and dedicated OIG staff for its signifi cant 
achievements during this reporting period.
Gordon S. Heddell
Inspector General
CONTENTS
SELECTED STATISTICS ...........................................................1
SIGNIFICANT CONCERNS ........................................................2 
LABOR RACKETEERING
INTERNAL UNION INVESTIGATIONS .....................................7 
BENEFIT PLAN INVESTIGATIONS ........................................9
LABOR-MANAGEMENT INVESTIGATIONS ..............................11
WORKER SAFETY, HEALTH & WORKPLACE RIGHTS
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION ........................14 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION ...........18
EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING PROGRAMS
JOB CORPS ....................................................21 
WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT ..........................23
FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS .........24 
WORKER BENEFITS PROGRAMS
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS...........................28 
WAGE AND HOUR PROGRAMS ........................................31
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS .............33
DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT ..............................................35
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................38
APPENDIX ..........................................................................41
SE
LE
CT
ED
 S
TA
TI
ST
IC
S
 1
Selected Statistics
Investigative recoveries, cost-effi ciencies, restitutions,
fi nes and penalties, forfeitures, and civil monetary action1  .....................$32 million
Investigative cases opened ................................................................................222
Investigative cases closed ..................................................................................224
Investigative cases referred for prosecution .......................................................147
Investigative cases referred for administrative/civil action....................................94
Indictments .........................................................................................................406
Convictions .........................................................................................................253
Debarments ..........................................................................................................13
Audit and other reports issued..............................................................................39
Total questioned costs ........................................................................$133.9 million
Other monetary impact .........................................................................$34.0 million
Outstanding questioned costs resolved during this period ...................$22.4 million
      Allowed2  .........................................................................................$15.8 million
      Disallowed3 .......................................................................................$6.6 million
 1  This dollar amount does not include $23.5 million from a payment to the U.S. Government as part of a 
$458 million global settlement of criminal and civil liabilities involving the Central Artery/Tunnel Project in 
Boston known as the “Big Dig.” A portion of the $23.5 million payment resulted from the project management 
consultant’s failure to ensure that bills it received from contractors were accurate. This lack of oversight caused 
contractors to be overpaid. Although the OIG is not claiming this as a statistical accomplishment, the OIG’s work 
supported the resulting settlement agreement and made signifi cant contributions to this multiagency task force 
investigation.
 2  Allowed means a questioned cost that the DOL has not sustained.
 3 Disallowed means a questioned cost that the DOL has sustained or has agreed should not be charged to the 
government.
The OIG provides information and assistance to the Department and Congress in achieving effi cient and effective 
management of DOL programs. As part of our effort to focus attention on mission-critical management problems and their 
resolution, the OIG has identifi ed the following areas of signifi cant concern.
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Securing Information Technology Systems
Continuing Impact of Labor Racketeering
Maintaining the Integrity of Foreign Labor Certifi cation Programs
Improving Procurement Integrity
Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Job Corps Program
Inaccuracies Remain Unaddressed in DOL Employees’ Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) Accounts
the roof control plan for Utah’s 
Crandall Canyon Mine disclosed 
that MSHA was negligent in its 
review, approval, and oversight 
of the roof control plan and re-
lated amendments. 
As a result, miners’ safety 
could have been imperiled. We 
concluded that despite the fact 
that retreat mining, a high-risk 
mining technique, was being 
used at Crandall Canyon, 
MSHA failed to do everything 
necessary to be certain that the 
plan it approved would effectively 
protect miners. 
Also, MSHA could not show 
that its process was free from 
undue infl uence by the mine 
operator. 
As a regulatory agency, 
MSHA must be able to show that 
its decisions are not infl uenced 
by those it regulates and that its 
decisions are sound and based 
on rigorous, established, and 
documented processes and 
criteria.
MSHA’s ability to protect the health and safety of the more 
than 300,000 men and women 
working in our nation’s coal mines 
is a continuing concern.  Our 
work has consistently revealed 
a pattern of MSHA’s weak 
oversight, inadequate policies, 
and lack of accountability. 
Recently, we conducted 
audits of MSHA’s process for 
determining whether fatalities 
are mining related, MSHA’s 
statutory mandate to inspect 
underground coal mines, and the 
process MSHA used to approve 
the roof control plan at Utah’s 
Crandall Canyon Mine. Each of 
these audits disclosed signifi cant 
shortcomings that could threaten 
miners’ safety.
Our audit of how MSHA 
determines whether a fatality 
is mining related found several 
weaknesses due to inadequate 
policies. Specifi cally, investigators 
and decision makers lacked 
independence, investigative 
procedures were inconsistent, 
and investigative documentation 
was sometimes incomplete. It 
is important for MSHA to make 
reliable and well-documented 
chargeability decisions, so it 
can learn the causes of mining 
accidents and use this information 
to help prevent future accidents.
Our report on MSHA inspec-
tions revealed that MSHA did 
not complete 147 required safety 
inspections at 107 underground 
coal mines where approximately 
7,500 miners worked. 
When inspections did occur, 
MSHA could not ensure that criti-
cal inspection activities, such as 
review of roof control plans and 
testing for oxygen levels, were 
completed. 
Failure to conduct required 
safety inspections and to ensure 
that critical safety elements are 
reviewed places miners at risk 
because dangerous conditions 
may not be discovered and cor-
rected. Similarly, our audit of 
MSHA’s process for approving 
Protecting Worker Safety and Health
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Signifi cant Concerns
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The Inspector General Act of 1978 transferred responsibility for labor racketeering and organized crime investigations from the 
Department to the newly created OIG, establishing 
the OIG’s exclusive authority to conduct these 
investigations. The legislative history of this transfer 
is clear that Congress intended to ensure that labor 
racketeering investigations were conducted by an 
independent offi ce, free from both political and 
bureaucratic pressures.
Recently, however, the Department has asserted 
that the OIG does not have exclusive authority in this 
area, and the Offi ce of the Solicitor has distributed 
a legal opinion in this regard.  The OIG believes 
that the analysis found in this opinion is fl awed, 
because the Offi ce of the Solicitor incorrectly states 
that the OIG’s labor racketeering authority is derived 
from a delegation from the Secretary.  In fact, this 
authority is derived from section 9(a)(1)(J) of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978, which provides for a 
legislative transfer of authorities previously held by 
the Department. 
The OIG believes that the Department’s position 
both undermines congressional intent and may 
interfere with OIG investigations.  During the 
1970s, Department of Justice offi cials testifi ed 
that the Department’s level of effort and support 
for cases which involved labor racketeering and 
organized crime in the labor-management arena 
was not suffcient.  In response, then-Secretary 
of Labor Ray Marshall established an “Offi ce of 
Special Investigations” (OSI) in early 1978 which 
would, according to Congressional testimony by 
Secretary Marshall, “[R]eport directly to me....[and] 
have an independent staff and .... full authority to 
pursue [his] investigations free from political or 
bureaucratic pressures.”
In late 1978, all of OSI’s authority and 
responsibilities were statutorily transferred to the 
newly established Offi ce of Inspector General, and 
Congress was clearly aware that the transfer of 
these responsibilities included the Department’s 
labor racketeering and organized crime 
investigative function.  Although Congress was 
aware that Secretary Marshall had established an 
offi ce (OSI) which would be “free from political and 
bureaucratic pressures,” the head of this offi ce 
would still be reporting to the Secretary himself. 
Congress, by transferrring this function to the OIG, 
an “independent and objective unit,” ensured that 
these investigations would be completely free 
from such pressures.  As stated in the Inspector 
General Act, “Neither the head of the establishment 
nor the offi cer next in rank below such head shall 
prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from 
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
investigation.”  
For almost 30 years, the OIG has implemented 
an independent labor racketeering program, as 
intended by Congress.  Unless the OIG’s authority 
in this area remains exclusive, this independence 
will be compromised, OIG investigations may be 
subject to interference by the Department, and the 
clear congressional intent of the transfer of OSI’s 
labor racketeering function will be undercut.
A recent case demonstrates the importance of 
the OIG’s labor racketeering and organized crime 
investigative program.  In the largest indictment 
of organized crime members in nearly 30 years, 
62 members and associates of the Gambino 
Organized Crime Family were indicted on a number 
of charges, including racketeering conspiracy, 
extortion,  theft of union benefi ts, loan sharking, 
embezzlement of union funds, money laundering, 
and murder conspiracy.  The indictments refl ected 
the Gambino family’s control and infl uence over 
the construction industry in and around New York 
City.
The Department should continue to recognize 
the OIG’s exclusive labor racketeering authority as 
it has for the past three decades.
New Departmental Position on OIG’s 
Labor Racketeering Authority
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“Congress intended to ensure that labor racketeering investigations were conducted 
by an independent offi ce, free from both political and bureaucratic pressures.”
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that the Department had not 
addressed 51 previous agency-
specifi c recommendations to 
improve access controls. In 
addition, we made more than 
100 new recommendations 
related to access controls.
It is essential for the Department to ensure its information systems 
are secure. It is a continuing 
concern that DOL maintain 
its ability to keep up with new 
threats and IT developments; 
to provide assurances that IT 
systems function reliably; and to 
safeguard information assets. 
For several years, the OIG 
has reported weaknesses in the 
Deoartment’s security over who 
has access to the information in 
its systems that contain fi nancial 
and other sensitive information. 
During the FY 2007’s fi nancial 
statement audit, we reported 
Securing Information Technology Systems
Labor racketeering continues to have an impact on American workers, employers, and the public through reduced wages 
and benefi ts, diminished competitive business 
opportunities, and increased costs for goods 
and services. The OIG is recognized nationally 
as a primary authority and resource on labor 
racketeering and related organized crime 
matters.
Protecting workers’ health, retirement, and 
welfare benefi t plans from fraud is a major focus 
of our investigative work. We continue to pursue 
corrupt plan offi cials and to combat the infl uence 
of organized crime against these assets.
In a major organized crime case, 62 members 
and associates of the Gambino Organized Crime 
Family were indicted in February 2008 on charges 
including racketeering conspiracy, embezzlement 
of union funds, money laundering, and murder 
conspiracy. 
This case revealed the strong  hold that organized 
crime had over all levels of the construction industry 
in New York City and beyond, from small, private 
projects to large-scale public works contracts. Many 
of these construction companies allegedly paid a 
“mob tax” in return for protection and permission 
to operate. 
Through their alleged control of these companies, 
the Gambino Organized Crime Family caused the 
theft of union dues and of health and pension 
funds, directly impacting the welfare and future of 
many workers. 
We will continue to work with our law-
enforcement partners and U.S. attorneys to combat 
labor racketeering to safeguard workers and their 
benefi ts.
Continuing Impact of Labor Racketeering
a conspiracy with his brothers 
to submit fraudulent labor 
certifi cation applications to 
DOL in an effort to obtain green 
cards for foreign nationals. They 
charged the foreign nationals 
more than $27,000 for each 
card. 
The OIG continues to 
recommend that the Department 
consider, in conjunction with the 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (USCIS), a legislative 
proposal to require foreign 
nationals to have their eligibility 
determined by USCIS before 
DOL reviews the employer’s 
labor certifi cation application.
The integrity of the Department’s foreign labor certifi cation 
programs is a major concern, 
as OIG investigations continue 
to uncover fraud against these 
programs. Our investigations 
involving immigration consultants 
and attorneys, employers, and 
applications have resulted in 
signifi cant convictions, prison 
sentences, restitutions, and 
forfeitures. For example, our 
investigation of four conspirators 
who prepared and submitted 
fraudulent applications for H-2B 
temporary foreign workers 
resulted in prison sentences of 
up to 41 months and a $1 million 
judgment. 
These defendants also took 
advantage of the devastation 
caused by Hurricane Katrina by 
fraudulently obtaining certifi cation 
from the Department for nearly 
250 H-2B temporary foreign 
workers, purportedly on behalf of 
four New Orleans hotels. We will 
continue to aggressively pursue 
those who seek to defraud the 
Department’s foreign labor 
certifi cation programs.
In another case, the owner 
of a construction company 
pled guilty and was ordered to 
forfeit $250,000 for his role in 
Maintaining the Integrity of Foreign Labor 
Certifi cation Programs
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In December 2006, DOL informed its agencies that thousands of DOL employees’ TSP account   balances 
were incorrect.  Specifi cally, employees did not 
receive agency matching contributions, or they 
received contributions to which they were not 
entitled.  In addition, DOL indicated that TSP 
data in the payroll system was inaccurate for a 
signifi cant number of employees.  The OIG is 
concerned that the Department, along with its 
payroll provider, USDA’s National Finance Center, 
have not completed the resolution of these serious 
inaccuracies that potentially impact DOL employee 
retirement calculations.  If the Department does 
not complete the corrections of employees’ TSP 
account and TSP data element errors, before DOL’s 
planned migration to a new payroll service provider 
next year, an already complex problem will be 
exacerbated.
Inaccuracies Remain Unaddressed in DOL 
Employees’ TSP Accounts
5
OIG audits continue to raise signifi cant concerns about Job Corps’s ability to report accurate and reliable fi nancial 
and performance data. For example, over the past 
few years, we have identifi ed shortcomings in the 
reporting of on-board strength and attendance 
at a number of centers, areas where we have 
consistently noted problems. 
An audit of the Tulsa Job Corps Center 
substantiated a hotline allegation that the center 
inappropriately infl ated on-board strength. It is 
essential for Job Corps to have reliable, accurate, 
and timely data so that the Department can evaluate 
how well contractors are providing services. The 
OIG has recommended that Job Corps improve its 
monitoring and oversight to improve performance 
and fi nancial accountability of contractors.
Ensuring the Effectiveness of the 
Job Corps Program
grants totaling $57 million. 
Furthermore, ETA could not 
adequately justify why it awarded 
these grants without competition, 
and it did not consistently 
document its review of unsolicited 
grant proposals. As a result, ETA 
may not have made the best 
decisions to achieve the goals 
for these job-training grants. 
The OIG has recommended that 
ETA ensure that competition is 
encouraged for discretionary grant 
awards and that award decisions 
are documented adequately.
As discussed in previous semiannual reports, the Department 
has yet to appoint a  Chief 
Acquisition Offi cer, whose 
primary duty is acquisition 
management, as required 
by the Services Acquisition 
Reform Act. Our previous audits 
have raised concerns about 
preferential treatment in awards, 
procurement actions that were 
not in the government’s best 
interest, and confl icts of interest 
in awards.  
In addition, our recent 
audit of High Growth Job 
Training Initiative grants raised 
signifi cant concerns about the 
Department’s practices in regard 
to its grant making activities. 
The Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA) awarded 
157 high growth grants, totaling 
$271 million, between July 1, 
2001, and March 31, 2007. Of this 
amount, ETA non-competitively 
awarded 133 grants totaling 
$237 million. We found that 
ETA could not demonstrate that 
it followed proper procedures 
when it awarded 35 high-growth 
Improving Procurement Integrity
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The OIG at the DOL has a unique programmatic responsibility to investigate labor racketeering and/or 
organized crime infl uence against unions, employee benefi t plans, and workers. The Inspector General Act 
of 1978 transferred responsibility for labor racketeering and organized crime–related investigations from 
the Department to the OIG. In doing so, Congress recognized the need to place the labor racketeering 
investigative function in an independent law enforcement offi ce free from political interference and 
competing priorities. Since the 1978 passage of the Inspector General Act, OIG Special Agents, working 
in association with the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, have been 
performing criminal investigations to combat labor racketeering in all its forms.
The following cases are illustrative of our work in helping to eradicate both traditional and nontraditional 
labor racketeering in the nation’s labor unions, employee benefi t plans, and workplaces.
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Nontraditional Organized Crime: Our current investigations are documenting an evolution of labor racketeering and/or organized crime corruption. We are fi nding that nontraditional organized 
criminal groups are engaging in racketeering and other crimes against workers in both union and nonunion 
environments. Moreover, they are exploiting DOL’s foreign labor certifi cation and Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) programs.
Traditional Organized Crime: Over the past two decades, the OIG has conducted extensive 
criminal investigations of labor racketeering. 
Traditionally, organized crime groups have been 
involved in benefi t plan fraud, violence against 
union members, embezzlement, and extortion. 
Our investigations continue to identify complex 
fi nancial and investment schemes used to defraud 
benefi t fund assets, resulting in millions of dollars 
in losses to plan participants. The schemes include 
embezzlement or other sophisticated methods, such 
as fraudulent loans or excessive fees paid to corrupt 
union and benefi t plan service providers.
OIG investigations have demonstrated that abuses 
by service providers are particularly egregious due 
to their potential for large dollar losses and because 
they often affect several plans at the same time. As 
of March 31, 2008, the OIG’s inventory of more than 
190 benefi t plan cases included 45 service provider 
investigations that had more than $1 billion in plan 
assets potentially at risk. The OIG is committed 
to safeguarding American workers against being 
victimized by labor racketeering and/or organized 
crime.
Impact of Labor Racketeering: Labor racketeering activities carried out by organized 
crime groups affect the general public in many 
ways. Because organized crime’s exercise of 
market power is usually concealed from public 
view, millions of consumers unknowingly pay what 
amounts to a tax or surcharge on a wide range of 
goods and services. In addition, by controlling a key 
union local, an organized crime group can control 
the pricing in an entire industry. 
Our internal union cases involve instances of corruption, including offi cers who abuse their positions 
of authority in labor organizations to embezzle money from union and member benefi t plan accounts and 
defraud members of their right to honest services. Investigations in this area also focus on situations in 
which organized crime groups control or infl uence a labor organization, frequently to infl uence an industry 
for corrupt purposes or to operate traditional vice schemes. Following are examples of our work in this 
area.
INTERNAL UNION INVESTIGATIONS
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B rian McLaughlin, a former New York State assemblyman, 
business manager of the J 
Division of Local Union No. 3 of 
the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, and president 
of the New York City Central Labor 
Council (CLC), pled guilty on 
March 7, 2008, to violation of the 
RICO Act. McLaughlin admitted 
to committing 21 specifi c offenses 
and to a forfeiture allegation 
contained in the indictment. 
McLaughlin admitted to 
orchestrating a series of schemes 
and directing the actions of 
others to facilitate his thefts from 
organizations such as the CLC, the 
Electchester Athletic Association, 
the New York State Assembly, 
and the William Jefferson Clinton 
Democratic Club. 
McLaughlin admitted to making 
false statements in connection 
with a mortgage application 
submitted to a federally insured 
fi nancial institution, committing 
numerous violations of the Taft-
Hartley Act, and using mail and 
wire fraud schemes to deprive 
the J Division of Local 3 and its 
union members of their rights to 
his honest services as a union 
offi cial. 
The NYC CLC is a chartered 
affi liate of the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations. 
As a former New York State 
assemblyman, McLaughlin 
represented the 25th Assembly 
District in Queens, New York. 
This is a joint investigation 
with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the 
New York City Department of 
Investigation. United States v. 
Brian M. McLaughlin (S.D. New 
York).
Former New York State Assemblyman Pleads 
Guilty to Racketeering
“McLaughlin admitted to orchestrating a series of schemes and directing the actions of 
others to facilitate his thefts from organizations...”
Salvatore “Hot Dogs” Battaglia, a member of the Genovese La Cosa Nostra (LCN) Family and the former president of Local 
1181 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, pled guilty 
on January 18, 2008, to RICO charges. Specifi cally, 
he pled guilty to three racketeering acts of extortion 
and unlawful receipt of labor payments from three 
major bus company owners servicing New York 
City schools. Using both his position as president of 
Local 1181 (a union that represents approximately 
15,000 school bus drivers and school bus escorts 
in New York City) and his status as a member in 
the LCN Family, Battaglia infl uenced several areas 
within his purview in exchange for tens of thousands 
of dollars in illegal payments. 
Battaglia received money from bus companies 
that contracted with the New York City Department 
of Education in exchange for not organizing the 
companies. Battaglia demanded and received 
per capita cash payments from the owners and 
operators of a medical center in exchange for 
Local 1181’s agreement to increase per capita 
reimbursements for services provided to union 
members by the medical center and for Local 1181’s 
agreement to pay for those services. Battaglia’s 
plea agreement includes a forfeiture allegation of 
$1 million. He faces 57–71 months’ imprisonment. 
This is an ongoing investigation with the FBI and 
Offi ce of Labor Management Standards (OLMS). 
United States v. Ianniello et al. (S.D. New York).
Former Local Union President Pleads Guilty to 
Three Racketeering Acts
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Joseph Totaro, a member of Plumbers Local 1, was sentenced on January 30, 2008, to 27 months of incarceration, including 
21 months of time served followed by 3 years of 
supervised release, and enrollment in a substance 
abuse program. Totaro created and managed a 
Web site on which he displayed statements, hostile 
images, and threats that he would kill the business 
manager if that person were to win the Local 1 union 
election and remain business manager. United 
States v. Joseph Totaro (S.D. New York).
Plumbers Local 1 Member Sentenced for 
Making Threats to Kill and Injure
T he former bookkeeper and executive assistant to the former president 
of International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters Local Union 19 in 
Houston was indicted on October 
27, 2007, for allegedly embezzling 
$140,000 from Local 19. She 
allegedly used her position to 
write several checks payable to 
herself, which she subsequently 
deposited into a personal bank 
account. The defendant allegedly 
falsifi ed union journals, invoices, 
and vouchers to cover up the 
embezzlement. The scheme was 
Texas Bookkeeper Allegedly Embezzles 
$140,000 from Teamsters Local 19
perpetrated between 2003 and 
2006. This is a joint investigation 
with the OLMS.   
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BENEFIT PLAN INVESTIGATIONS
The OIG is responsible for combating corruption involving the monies in union-sponsored benefi t plans. 
Those pension plans and health and welfare benefi t plans comprise hundreds of billions of dollars in assets. 
Our investigations have shown that the assets remain vulnerable to corrupt union offi cials and organized 
crime infl uence. Benefi t plan service providers continue to be a strong focus of OIG investigations.
Sixty-two members and associates of the Gambino LCN 
Organized Crime Family—
including its acting boss, acting 
underboss, and consigliere—
were indicted on February 6, 
2008, on charges including 
racketeering conspiracy, 
extortion, theft of union benefi ts, 
mail fraud, false statements, 
loan sharking, embezzlement of 
union funds, money laundering, 
illegal gambling, and murder 
conspiracy. 
Both construction industry 
principals and union offi cials 
were among those charged 
for crimes spanning more than 
three decades. Many of these 
construction companies allegedly 
paid a “mob tax” in return for 
protection and permission to 
operate. The indictments illustrate 
the Gambino family’s control and 
infl uence over the construction 
industry in and around New York 
City. 
Twenty-fi ve of the defendants, 
all members and associates of the 
Gambino family, are charged with 
racketeering conspiracy, which 
includes predicate acts involving 
murder, attempted murder, 
murder conspiracy, felony murder, 
robbery, extortion, conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and marijuana, 
securities fraud, mail fraud, loan 
sharking, theft of union benefi ts, 
illegal gambling, and bribery. 
The evidence related to 
many of the charged crimes 
consists of hundreds of hours of 
recorded conversations secured 
by a cooperating witness who 
infi ltrated the Gambino family 
over a three-year period. This 
investigation also identifi ed 
corruption within Locals 731 and 
725 of the Laborers International 
Union of North America (LIUNA).
The Gambino family allegedly 
profi ted from extortion-related 
rackets at construction sites 
involving trucking contracts, which 
they controlled, and theft of union 
benefi ts from the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 
Union 282. 
This is an ongoing investigation 
with the New York State Organized 
Crime Task Force (NYS-
OCTF), FBI, U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT), Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), New York 
City Department of Investigation, 
New York City Business Integrity 
Commission, and the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority.
“Both construction industry principals and union offi cials were among 
those charged for crimes spanning more than three decades. Many of 
these construction companies allegedly paid a “mob tax” in return for 
protection and permission to operate.” 
Sweeping Indictments Against Gambino 
Organized Crime Family, Union, Company Offi cials
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Fund Administrator, Fund Trustee  Sentenced 
for Embezzling more than   $155,000
William B. Wofford, owner of Premier Consulting Inc., was sentenced on January 22, 2008, to 51 months of 
incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and 
restitution of $277,937 following his conviction for 
embezzling funds from an employee pension plan. 
Wofford had established Premier Employer’s Group 
401(k) Plan in 1995. In 2002, the plan’s trust fund 
came under Wofford’s direct control, and he was 
listed as the sole signatory of the account. He used 
the money from this trust fund to pay himself and to 
purchase and pay expenses for several of his failed 
businesses. Between 2002 and 2004, Wofford 
made improper withdrawals from the trust fund. He 
often directed his bookkeeper to create false loan 
documents to convert the trust fund money for uses 
other than for the benefi t of the participants and 
benefi ciaries. Wofford disguised withdrawals as 
payments to his bookkeeper for administrative fees. 
This was a joint investigation with the Employee 
Benefi ts Security Administration (EBSA). United 
States v. Wofford (N.D. Texas).
Isaac Barocas, the former president of the International Union of Production, Clerical, and Public Employees Local 911 and the 
former scholarship director of the LIUNA Local 
734 Welfare and Educational Fund, pled guilty on 
December 14, 2007, to concealing a felony and 
assault. 
Among other crimes, Barocas admitted that he 
attempted to run down an EBSA investigator with 
his car in 2005 while the investigator was assisting 
DOL-OIG agents in the service of a grand jury 
subpoena. Barocas is a business associate of 
Genovese LCN soldier, August “Augie” Vergallito. 
Between 1999 and 2006, Augie Vergallito exercised 
control over the affairs of Local 911. 
Augie Vergallito, the former business manager of 
LIUNA Local 734, and his wife, Rhoda Vergallito, 
the former LIUNA Local 734 confi dential offi cer, 
pled guilty on February 5, 2008, for their roles in 
a conspiracy to embezzle approximately $100,000 
from Local 911. 
The money was embezzled through salary 
payments to Rhoda Vergallito for her no-show 
position as Local 911 offi ce manager. Vergallito’s 
daughter, Kim Vergallito, former Local 911 vice 
president, secretary treasurer, and executive board 
member, pled guilty on February 5, 2008, to perjury 
charges for providing the name of a fi ctitious Local 
911 president in response to questions about the 
offi cers of the local. 
Kim’s ex husband, Bernard Dwyer, the former 
scholarship director of the Local 734 Welfare and 
Educational Fund, pled guilty on January 15, 2008, 
for his role in a conspiracy to embezzle in excess of 
$65,000 from the fund between 2003 and 2004. 
Charles Purcel, LIUNA Local 734 and Local 911 
accountant and bookkeeper, pled guilty on February 
27, 2008, to knowingly and intentionally creating false 
documents that his attorney forwarded to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Offi ce before the start of Purcel’s Federal 
trial on conspiracy and false statement charges. 
The false documents contained numerous 
representations that could have persuaded a jury 
to acquit Purcel, or at least minimize his culpability, 
with respect to the criminal charges pending against 
him. This is a joint investigation with EBSA. United 
States v. August Vergallito et al. (D-New Jersey).
Gadwiga Grace, the former fund administrator for the 
Printing Industry Local 23 (Local 
23) Fringe Benefi t Fund, and 
Manuel Moscoso, a fund trustee, 
were sentenced on December 
14, 2007, for embezzling more 
than $155,000 from a fund bank 
account. Grace was sentenced 
to nine months’ imprisonment 
and ordered to pay $70,000 
in forfeiture. Moscoso was 
sentenced to one year and one 
day imprisonment and ordered 
to pay $80,000 in forfeiture. The 
embezzled account was largely 
funded by deductions from Local 
Company Owner Sentenced for Embezzling 
Funds from 401(k) Plan’s Trust Fund
23 members’ salaries. Grace 
and Moscoso used the stolen 
funds to pay for personal credit 
card bills, electronic supplies, 
guns, and other non-union-
related expenses. This is a joint 
investigation with EBSA. United 
States v. Moscoso et al. (S.D. 
New York).
Individuals Plead Guilty to Union-Related Crimes
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Labor-management relations cases involve corrupt relationships between management and union 
offi cials. Typical labor-management cases range from collusion between representatives of management 
and corrupt union offi cials to the use of the threat of “labor problems” to extort money or benefi ts from 
employers. 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT INVESTIGATIONS
James Delio, a Genovese Crime Family soldier and a construction company owner, was sentenced on February 8, 2008, for conspiring to defraud the New York City District Council of Carpenters (DCC) of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Carpenters’ Union). He 
was sentenced to 33 months’ incarceration, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Delio was ordered 
to pay $1,871,550 in restitution, of which $1 million will go to the Carpenters’ Union and $871,550 will go 
to the IRS. As part of his plea, Delio agreed to forfeit $1.5 million, jointly and severally, with co-defendants, 
Joseph Delio and Fred Nisall. The investigation centered on the Genovese Organized Crime Family’s 
control of the drywall industry in and around New York City. Delio conspired to defraud the DCC and the 
DCC Benefi t Funds by paying workers off the books, employing nonunion workers, not paying workers 
union-scale wages, and misrepresenting the number of workers on reports submitted to the DCC and the 
Funds. United States v. Moscatiello et al. (S.D. New York).
Genovese  Crime Family Soldier Sentenced 
for Defrauding NYC District Council of 
Carpenters
Patrick Noel McCaul and James Dermot McGonnell, the owners 
of Tri-Built Construction Inc. (Tri-
Built), a drywall construction 
company in New York, pled 
guilty on November 20, 2007, to 
conspiring to defraud the District 
Council of New York City and 
Vicinity of the United Brotherhood 
of Carpenters and Joiners 
(Carpenters’ Union) Benefi t 
Funds of millions of dollars by 
using nonunion labor, paying 
union carpenters off the books, 
and bribing shop stewards and 
an employee of the benefi t funds 
to assist in the fraud. 
David Veltri, a Carpenters 
Union shop steward, was 
sentenced November 2, 2007, 
to 27 months’ imprisonment, 
followed by 3 years of supervised 
release; an $8,000 fi ne; a $100 
special assessment fee; and 
$70,000 in restitution to the benefi t 
funds. Veltri previously pled guilty 
to Taft-Hartley Act violations of 
bribery of a union offi cial.
Between 1993 and 2004, Tri-
Built, holding itself out as a union 
contractor, was hired for numerous 
construction projects in New York 
City. Tri-Built was a party to a 
collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) with the Carpenters’ Union. 
Under this agreement, Tri-Built 
was obligated to use union labor 
and pay union wages and benefi ts 
to all carpenters employed on Tri-
Built’s jobsites. 
McCaul and McGonnell 
“The investigation centered on the Genovese Organized Crime Family’s control of 
the drywall industry in and around New York City. “
Drywall Company Owners Forfeit $1.5 Million to   
Carpenter’s Union Benefi t Funds
underbid jobs with the intention 
of not complying with the CBA, 
ultimately diverting at least $6.5 
million from the union benefi t 
funds.
To avoid detection of their 
fraud, the defendants bribed 
Carpenters’ Union shop stewards 
to submit false reports, under-
reporting the true number of 
carpenters and hours worked 
on several Tri-Built jobsites, and 
paid a then-employee of the 
Benefi t Funds to destroy internal 
union records. As part of their 
plea agreement, they will forfeit 
$1.5 million, which will be paid 
to the Carpenters’ Union benefi t 
funds. United States v. McGaul 
et al. and United States v. Veltri 
(S.D. New York).
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Michael “Mickey” Annucci, a former shop steward for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners (UBCJ) Local 
157 in New York, was found guilty on February 
7, 2008, of conspiracy, embezzlement from an 
employee benefi t plan, wire fraud, and unlawful 
payment to a union offi cial. While employed by L&D 
Installers (L&D), Annucci assisted L&D in embezzling 
more than $500,000 from the Benefi t Funds of 
Local 157 on a long-term project during which he 
omitted 22,000 hours from his shop steward reports. 
Annucci held additional offi cial positions with the 
Carpenters’ Union, including executive delegate to 
the DCC representing Local 157. He was also on 
the DCC trial committee responsible for imposing 
discipline on carpenters who broke union rules.
On December 28, 2007, L&D made the fi nal 
payment of the $2,084,654 owed to the Carpenters’ 
Union Benefi t Funds for unpaid benefi t contributions. 
L&D defrauded the Benefi t Funds of that fi nal 
payment by utilizing a nonunion payroll and failing 
to make contributions into the Benefi t Funds as 
required by the CBA. United States v. Annucci et al. 
(S.D. New York).
Shop Steward Guilty of Embezzling more than 
$500,000 from Carpenters Local 157
The current business manager and a former president of Local 
825 of the International Union 
of Operating Engineers (IUOE) 
were indicted on March 11, 2008, 
for allegedly taking cash bribes 
and other things of value from 
construction contractors to ensure 
labor peace and to allow the use 
of nonunion labor. 
On March 26, 2008, the owner 
of a steel construction fi rm pled 
guilty, admitting that in exchange 
for at least $58,000 in bribes 
paid to an IUOE engineer, he 
was allowed to ignore certain 
provisions of the IUOE Local 825 
CBA. 
In addition, a former IUOE 
business agent pled guilty on the 
same day to charges of violating 
the Taft-Hartley Act by allowing 
numerous contractors throughout 
New Jersey to ignore the IUOE 
Local 825 CBA in exchange for 
bribes totaling between $200,000 
and $400,000.
Several Indicted for Taking Bribes
On March 18, 2008, the IUOE 
placed its Local 825 under 
emergency supervision. In 
addition, the IUOE headquarters 
suspended the business 
manager without pay based on 
his indictment. 
This was a joint investigation 
with the FBI, IRS, and EBSA.
 12
“While employed by L&D Installers (L&D), Annucci assisted L&D in embezzling 
more than $500,000 from the Benefi t Funds of Local 157 on a long-term project 
during which he omitted 22,000 hours from his shop steward reports.” 
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The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, as amended by the Mine Improvement and New 
Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), charges the Mine Safety and Health Administration with 
protecting the health and safety of more than 300,000 men and women working in our nation’s mines.
In recent years, OIG audits of MSHA’s programs and performance have revealed several areas in need 
of improvement. For example, our audit of MSHA’s statutory requirement to inspect underground coal 
mines at least four times per year found that MSHA did not ensure that these inspections were performed. 
Our most recent audit found that MSHA could not show that it had made the right decision in approving 
the roof control plan at Utah’s Crandall Canyon Mine. The OIG will continue to exercise strong oversight of 
MSHA’s administration of its health and safety mission.
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
At the request of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions Committee, we 
conducted an audit of MSHA’s 
roof control plan approval for 
Crandall Canyon Mine. The 
request followed the tragedy that 
occurred at the mine on August 
6, 2007, in which six miners were 
killed and three rescue workers 
were subsequently fatally injured. 
Specifi cally, the Committee 
asked us to review the process 
MSHA District 9 used to review 
MSHA’s process for approving 
the roof control plan and the plan 
amendment that was in effect at 
the time of the disaster; the rigor 
of MSHA’s review; and information 
about how MSHA made the 
decision to allow rescuers into the 
mine after the initial collapse on 
August 6, 2007. 
Our fi rst fi nding was that MSHA 
could not demonstrate that it 
had made the right decision in 
approving the roof control plan 
at Crandall. Despite the critical 
importance of roof control to 
underground mining operations in 
general—particularly to the high-
risk retreat mining being done at 
Crandall Canyon—MSHA could 
not show that it did everything 
appropriate to ensure that the 
Crandall Canyon roof control plan 
was suffi cient to protect miners. 
MSHA did not have a rigorous, 
transparent review and approval 
process for roof control plans 
consisting of explicit criteria 
and plan evaluation factors, 
appropriate documentation, and 
active oversight and supervision 
by headquarters and District 9 
management.
In addition, we found that 
MSHA did not provide guidance 
on how to select and use criteria 
to evaluate roof control plans, and 
as a result, plan approval criteria 
were left to the discretion of each 
individual District Manager. 
Moreover, MSHA Headquarters 
rarely reviewed District Managers’ 
plan approval process, or the 
evaluation criteria the Managers 
used to approve plans. As a 
result, Districts may not have 
used appropriate and consistent 
criteria for similar circumstances, 
and approved plans may not have 
adequately protected miners. 
Furthermore, MSHA did not 
require that District Managers 
document the criteria they used 
in assessing specifi c plans, and 
it rarely reviewed the District 
Managers’ decisions. 
MSHA’s inability to show that 
it did everything necessary to 
make the appropriate decision 
in approving the roof control 
plan also prevented us from
conclusively determining that 
MSHA’s approval of the plan was 
free from improper infl uence by 
the mine operator, regardless of 
any pressure from the operator to 
expedite its approval process. 
While we attempted to 
compare the review and approval 
process used in District 9 to the 
process used for mines that 
were not owned by Mr. Murray, 
MSHA’s lack of documentation 
MSHA Could Not Show It Made Right Decision 
In Approving Roof Control Plan at Crandall 
Canyon Mine4
“MSHA could not show that it did everything appropriate to ensure that the 
Crandall Canyon roof control plan was suffi cient to protect miners.”
4 Retreat mining, a high-risk underground mining technique in which miners remove pillars of coal that had previously been left to support the mine roof, 
was being used at the Crandall Canyon Mine. This mining technique is designed to maximize the amount of coal reserves recovered from a mine. As miners 
remove these pillars, they “retreat” toward the mine entrance allowing the unsupported roof to collapse behind them. The process is risky due to stresses on 
the fi nal pillars and the potential for unplanned cave-ins.  14
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The Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 requires MSHA to perform a complete inspection of each underground coal mine 
four times per year to safeguard miners. Since 
missed or incomplete inspections can place miners 
at risk, it is critical that MSHA fulfi ll this inspection 
requirement. 
We conducted a performance audit of MSHA’s 
underground coal mine inspection process. The 
audit objectives were to determine whether MSHA 
was ensuring that all underground coal mines 
received mandatory regular inspections and whether 
critical inspection activities required during the 
inspections were completed. 
We found that MSHA did not ensure that all 
underground coal mines received the required 
regular safety inspections. Specifi cally, MSHA 
did not complete one or more statutorily required 
inspections at 107 of the nation’s 731 underground 
coal mines during FY 2006. It is important to note 
that approximately 7,500 miners were employed 
at the 107 mines that MSHA did not inspect as 
“It is important to note that approximately 7,500 miners were employed 
at the 107 mines that MSHA did not inspect as required.”
MSHA Failed to Perform All Required Mine 
Safety Inspections
prevented us from making such 
a comparison. In our opinion, 
as a regulatory agency charged 
with protecting miner safety and 
health, MSHA must be able to 
show that its decisions are not 
infl uenced by those it regulates 
and that its decisions are sound, 
based on rigorous, established, 
and documented processes and 
criteria.
Regarding MSHA’s decision-
making process during the 
rescue operation, we found 
that MSHA worked with mine 
operator employees to develop 
rescue plans and exercised fi nal 
approval authority over all rescue 
activities. 
On August 8, 2007, MSHA’s 
Assistant Secretary gave 
approval for a CNN camera 
crew to enter the mine to take 
photographs. However, some 
local MSHA personnel disagreed 
with the Assistant Secretary’s 
decision. 
We determined that MSHA 
does not have any guidelines 
on non-rescue activities during 
an active rescue operation. 
This lack of guidance increases 
the potential for MSHA to make 
decisions without considering all 
pertinent information about safety 
and other issues. 
We concluded that MSHA was 
negligent in its review, approval, and 
oversight of the Roof Control Plan 
and amendments. Specifi cally, 
MSHA did not require the use of 
Our report contained nine recommendations to MSHA for 
improvement. Specifi cally, we recommended that MSHA: 
develop a rigorous, standard, and transparent process for • 
evaluating and approving roof control plans; 
require risk assessments specifi c to the particular mining • 
operation prior to plan approval;
establish explicit criteria and guidance for determining safety • 
risks of plans; 
issue policy and guidance on the use of computer models; • 
issue policy mandating active oversight by District Managers • 
by requiring documentation of how they reached their 
conclusions that approved plans will provide effective roof 
control; 
issue policy on conditions governing non-rescue activities • 
occurring during active rescue operations; 
establish a Memorandum of Understanding with BLM to share • 
inspection and other information on mine conditions affecting 
safety; and 
conduct a new review of all existing roof control plans.• 
MSHA concurred with all of our recommendations and stated that 
it has initiated or planned numerous corrective actions. (Report 
No. 05-08-003-06-001; issued March 31, 2008)
explicit criteria, consideration of 
potentially relevant information, a 
record of plan review activities, or 
active supervision and oversight 
of decisions made at the District 
level. 
15
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required. In total, 147 required 
inspections were not completed 
at the 107 mines. We concluded 
that MSHA failed to complete 
required inspections because of 
decreasing inspection resources 
during a period of increasing 
mining activity. The relative 
number of inspectors decreased 
by 18 percent between FY 2002 
and FY 2006, while mining activity 
increased by 9 percent. 
Furthermore, the number of 
inspectors in the 11 MSHA districts 
was not commensurate with the 
mining activity in the districts, 
and management’s monitoring 
of inspection completions was 
inadequate.
We also found that inspections 
were missed or not completed 
because MSHA did not place 
adequate management emphasis 
on ensuring compliance with 
the statutory mandate. Missed 
or incomplete inspections can 
imperil miners’ safety because 
hazardous mine conditions may 
not be identifi ed and corrected.
In addition, we found that 
MSHA could not demonstrate 
that all critical inspection activities 
required for inspections were 
completed or that inspections 
were thorough, because MSHA 
policy did not require inspectors 
to document all critical inspection 
activities they perform. We 
identifi ed a number of inspection 
activities for which MSHA did not 
require documentation, including 
inspection of roof conditions and 
ventilation facilities and testing 
for oxygen level defi ciencies. 
Furthermore, when MSHA 
policy did require documentation 
for inspection activities, 
supervisors did not consistently 
ensure that inspectors completed 
the documentation or that the 
inspection was thorough.
After the August 2007 tragedy 
at Utah’s Crandall Canyon Mine, 
we added a review of inspections 
at that mine to our audit. We 
found that during FY 2006 and 
FY 2007, MSHA had performed 
the seven required inspections 
at the Crandall Canyon Mine. 
However, one inspection was 
found to be incomplete and three 
of the inspections had signifi cant 
inspection and supervisory 
defi ciencies. For example, 
MSHA documentation indicated 
that supervisory oversight for 
Crandall’s fi nal inspection before 
the August tragedy was neither 
adequate nor timely. 
Because the inspection 
defi ciencies we identifi ed were 
caused by weaknesses in policies 
and procedures, it is likely that 
similar documentation problems 
existed in all 11 Coal Mine Safety 
and Health districts. In fact, 
MSHA found similar inspection 
and supervisory oversight 
problems during internal reviews 
of three fatal underground 
mining accidents at the Sago 
(West Virginia), Aracoma (West 
Virginia), and Darby (Kentucky) 
mines. 
We made seven 
recommendations to MSHA. 
Key recommendations included 
ensuring that inspection 
resources are commensurate 
with mining activity; documenting 
all critical inspection activities as 
performed; and requiring Field 
Offi ce supervisors to certify 
inspections as thorough and 
complete. 
MSHA has initiated or planned 
corrective action to address all 
seven of our recommendations. 
(Report No. 05-08-001-06-001; 
issued November 16, 2007)
At the request of the House Committee on Education and Labor, we conducted an audit of how MSHA determines whether 
a fatality is mining related, or “chargeable.” It is 
important for MSHA to make reliable and well-
documented chargeability decisions, so that it can 
learn the causes of mining accidents and use this 
information to help prevent future accidents.
Although we did not identify any instances in 
which MSHA’s decisions were contradicted by 
reliable evidence or in which similar circumstances 
produced different decisions, our audit disclosed 
several weaknesses in MSHA’s process. For 
example, we found that investigators and decision 
makers lacked independence, investigative 
procedures were not consistent, and investigative 
documentation was sometimes lacking. 
These shortcomings increased the likelihood that 
such errors could occur.
We noted several issues pertaining to a lack 
of independence that could lead to incorrect 
chargeability decisions. For example, the fi rst 
responder to the accident was often the same MSHA 
inspector who had enforcement responsibility for the 
mine where the accident occurred. 
Since MSHA lacked standard procedures for 
investigating fatalities, it did not require accident 
investigators to gather the same information for all 
MSHA Should Improve Its Process for 
Determining Whether Fatalities are Mining-
Related 
16
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fatalities; therefore, chargeability decisions could 
be based on incomplete or incorrect information. 
We also found that MSHA sometimes based 
its decision about chargeability on managers’ 
preliminary assessments—that is, if managers 
initially decided that a fatality was “likely to be 
nonchargeable,” MSHA conducted only a limited, 
less-detailed investigation. The lack of standard 
procedures could result in inaccurate chargeability 
decisions. In addition, we found that MSHA lacked 
suffi cient documentation to support its decisions.
We made seven recommendations to MSHA 
aimed at making investigations more independent 
and ensuring that chargeability decisions are based 
on complete, well-documented evidence. MSHA 
generally agreed with our recommendations. 
(Report No. 05-08-002-06-001; issued November 
14, 2007)
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The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), authorized by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970, promulgates and enforces occupational safety and health standards and provides 
compliance assistance to employers and employees.
OIG audits of OSHA’s programs and processes have identifi ed opportunities for strengthening 
OSHA’s enforcement and compliance assistance activities. For example, the OIG has noted the need for 
improvements in OSHA’s Consultation Program. In addition, over the past few years, OIG investigative 
work has resulted in the successful prosecution of employers who have willfully failed to provide adequate 
safety and protection to their employees, particularly in the construction industry.
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Two individuals who formerly represented the Committee on Contract 
Compliance, an organization that 
the men used to extort money from 
building contractors throughout 
New York City, were indicted on 
February 26, 2008, on charges of 
racketeering and extortion. 
They allegedly posed as 
persons representing government 
regulatory agencies in New York 
City and threatened to report 
bogus violations at jobsites unless 
they were given hundreds, and 
sometimes thousands, of dollars 
in payoffs. 
Many of the victimized 
contractors were immigrants. The 
two individuals threatened to 
report contractors to regulatory 
agencies, including OSHA. In 
some instances, they actually did 
fi le false complaints with these 
agencies.
The unnecessary site 
inspections interrupted and 
delayed construction projects, 
costing contractors considerable 
time and money. In addition 
to the inconvenience and 
increased costs to contractors, 
the hundreds of false complaints 
lodged with various city and 
Federal agencies, including 
OSHA and the New York City Fire 
Department, ultimately placed 
the safety of the general public at 
risk. For example, the defendants 
lodged numerous complaints with 
the fi re department, which, in turn, 
would dispatch a fi re truck and 
fi refi ghters to visit the locations. 
This is an ongoing investigation 
with the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Labor Racketeering 
Unit-Construction Industry 
Strike Force; New York City 
Department of Investigation, 
the OIG of the New York City 
Department of Buildings, the 
New York City Fire Department, 
the New York City Department 
of Information, Technology and 
Telecommunications, and OSHA.
Two Men Indicted for Extortion by Threats to 
File Safety Complaints 
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ETA awarded a $32.5 million earmark grant to the Consortium for Worker Education (CWE) in New York City to establish the 
Emergency Employment Clearinghouse to provide 
employment, training, and education services for 
workers and employers impacted by the September 
11, 2001, tragedy. The grant period was April 1, 
2002, through December 31, 2004. We chose to 
audit this grant in part because it was the largest 
earmark grant the Department had ever awarded.
Our audit, which covered the entire grant period, 
found that CWE had established the Emergency 
Employment Clearinghouse. However, we identifi ed 
signifi cant fi nancial and performance issues in the 
administration of this grant. Specifi cally, we found 
that CWE overstated the number of participants 
enrolled in the program by 3,682; claimed 366 
ineligible participants; and could not demonstrate 
that participants received employment services 
being funded by the grant. For example, we found 
that CWE had double-counted a large number 
of participants, could not document participants 
enrolled by two centers operated by CWE 
contractors, and enrolled hundreds of participants 
who did not demonstrate that they were authorized 
to work in the United States. 
Moreover, we determined that CWE charged 
costs to the grant that were not allowable and did not 
maintain adequate documentation to demonstrate 
participant eligibility and services. As a result, we 
questioned grant costs totaling $11,264,554. These 
fi ndings demonstrate the importance of careful 
monitoring and oversight to ensure that the millions 
of dollars used in grants are used for their intended 
purpose.
Furthermore, CWE could not provide documentation 
to support four of the fi ve participant outcomes 
it reported. As a result, we could not determine 
whether the grant met its outcome measures for 
training, placements, retention, and referrals to other 
programs. ETA monitors had earlier found similar 
fi nancial and performance issues; however, though 
the monitors performed some follow-up, they did not 
ensure that the issues were adequately corrected by 
CWE.
We made several recommendations, including 
that ETA recover the more than $11.2 million in 
questioned costs and that it improve its monitoring 
process. CWE disagreed with our fi ndings; however, 
it did not produce any additional documentation, and 
we did not revise our conclusions. (Report Number 
02-08-203-03-390; issued February 29, 2008)
Consortium for Worker Education Earmark 
Grant—Over $11 Million in Questioned Costs
T he High Growth Job Training Initiative (HGJTI) 
is a Presidential Initiative with 
the goal of helping workers 
acquire the skills necessary 
for jobs in high growth 
industries such as information 
technology and advanced 
manufacturing. Between July 
1, 2001, and March 31, 2007, 
the Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA) awarded 
133 high growth grants, totaling 
$235 million (87 percent) 
through non-competitive 
procurement methods.
In response to a request from 
Senator Tom Harkin, Chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Labor, 
Health, and Human Services, 
and Education and Related 
Agencies, we conducted an audit 
to determine if ETA followed 
proper procurement procedures 
in awarding these grants without 
competition. Our audit of 39 
grants awarded during FY 2003 
through FY 2007, totaling $70 
million, found that ETA could not 
demonstrate that it followed proper 
procurement procedures when it 
non-competitively awarded 35, or 
90 percent, high growth grants we 
reviewed, totaling $57 million. We 
also concluded that ETA did not 
adequately justify its decisions to 
award 10 of the non-competitive 
grants, and that ETA did not 
consistently document its review 
of unsolicited grant proposals. 
Specifi cally, we identifi ed 69 
occurrences in which ETA could not 
demonstrate that it had followed 
proper procurement procedures in 
awarding the 35 grants. As a result, 
ETA could not demonstrate that it 
made the best decisions for carrying 
out the goals of the high growth 
grants. 
Moreover, our audit disclosed that 
matching requirements of $34 million 
for nine grants were not carried 
forward in grant modifi cations. 
This could signifi cantly reduce the 
programs and levels of services 
provided from what was intended 
in the original grants. One of the 
justifi cations for awarding the 
grants non-competitively was that 
the grantee was providing external 
resources to support grant activities, 
in addition to the DOL funds it was 
ETA Awarded Job Training Grants without 
Competition
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seeking, with the intended 
effect of making DOL’s support of 
the activity highly cost-effective.
We made eight 
recommendations to ETA to 
improve management controls 
over grant awards. 
Our recommendations include 
requiring that ETA ensure that 
award decisions are documented 
adequately and that matching 
requirements are carried forward 
when grants are modifi ed. ETA 
agreed that its documentation 
could be improved and 
generally concurred with our 
recommendations; however, 
it disagreed with our fi nding 
pertaining to its compliance with 
procurement practices. 
ETA asserted that its 
decisions to award grants non-
competitively were justifi ed. 
ETA’s February 4, 2008, 
response to the fi nal audit report 
described a number of actions 
completed, ongoing, or planned in 
response to our recommendations. 
As a result, we consider one 
recommendation fully implemented, 
and we agree with ETA’s planned 
actions on three additional 
recommendations. 
Four recommendations remain 
unresolved, pending our receipt of 
additional information from ETA. 
(Report Number 02-08-201-03-
390; issued November 2, 2007)
JOB CORPS
Job Corps operates 122 centers throughout the United States and Puerto Rico to provide occupational 
skills, academic training, job placement services, and other support services, such as housing and 
transportation, to approximately 60,000 students each year. Its primary purpose is to assist eligible at-risk 
youth who need intensive education and training services. The OIG is statutorily required to audit Job Corps 
centers every three years. 
Recent audit work has revealed that some operators of Job Corps centers overstated their performance 
results (i.e., student job placement, high school diploma attainment, attendance, and training records) in 
order to improve the centers’ operating performance, which can result in the operating contractor receiving 
greater, performance-based, fi nancial incentives. During this Semiannual Report period, we completed two 
audits of Job Corps centers. 
Performance Audit Tulsa Job Corps Center 
Substantiated Hotline Allegations 
In response to four allegations in a hotline complaint, we conducted a performance audit of the Tulsa Job Corps Center, 
operated by ResCare Corporation under contract 
to DOL. 
We substantiated three of the four allegations. 
Regarding the fi rst allegation we substantiated, we 
found that center offi cials did not follow parental 
approval requirements to obtain or maintain 
adequate proof of parental consent when enrolling 
minors. Failure to obtain this consent could make 
it diffi cult for center staff to assess students and 
provide appropriate services. 
Second, we found that center offi cials did 
not maintain an Equal Employment Opportunity 
program for students as required. We found that 
the program was not adequate to ensure students’ 
awareness about how to fi le complaints about 
discriminatory treatment. 
Finally, we substantiated the allegation that the 
center overstated its on-board strength by retaining 
students who should have been separated. Including 
these students artifi cially distorted the center’s 
performance. 
It is important for DOL’s Offi ce of Job Corps to have 
reliable information about centers’ performance to 
help it determine contractor effi ciency. 
We found that center offi cials properly conducted 
and completed the required quarterly student 
surveys. Therefore, we did not substantiate the fourth 
allegation.
We made three recommendations for improvement 
at the Tulsa Center. 
The Offi ce of Job Corps has completed corrective 
action related to one of the recommendations and 
has agreed to take corrective actions on the other two 
recommendations. (Report Number 26-08-003-01-
370; issued March 13, 2008)
“It is important for DOL’s Offi ce of Job Corps to have reliable information 
about centers’ performance to help it determine contractor effi ciency.” 
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W e conducted a performance audit of the Schenck 
Job Corps Center in Pisgah 
Forest, North Carolina, which is 
operated by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture’s Forest Service 
through an interagency agreement 
with DOL. Our objectives were to 
determine whether the center’s 
fi nancial and performance data 
were accurate, and its internal 
controls and operational procedures 
complied with the Job Corps Policy 
& Requirements Handbook.
We found that Schenck’s 
management did not always report 
fi nancial and performance data 
accurately, and its internal controls 
and operational procedures 
did not always comply with Job 
Corps requirements. As a result, 
we questioned $171,719 in 
unsupported costs. 
In addition, we found a number 
of defi ciencies in Schenck’s 
student accountability controls. 
These controls are supposed 
to enable the center to know 
where students are at all times. 
For example, we concluded 
that the center’s sign in/out log 
was inadequate and that center 
management granted students 
leave in violation of Job Corps 
requirements. We also found 
that management had permitted 
students to exceed the allowable 
number of AWOL days and did 
not terminate students who 
failed to comply with attendance 
requirements. As a result, 
Schenck retained 74 students 
for a total of 3,000 days beyond 
their required termination dates. 
Reliable performance data are 
vital for Job Corps to be able to 
make accurate assessments of 
how well centers are meeting the 
needs of students.
We made 14 recommendations 
aimed at improving the overall 
accuracy of the fi nancial and 
performance data reported by 
Schenck to the Offi ce of Job Corps. 
Six of our recommendations 
addressed improvements 
to Schenck’s fi nancial 
management and reporting, and 
eight recommendations were 
directed at improving student 
accountability. The Offi ce of Job 
Corps has completed corrective 
actions related to 4 of the 14 
recommendations and has 
agreed to take corrective actions 
on the other 10 recommendations. 
(Report Number 26-08-002-01-
370; issued March 21, 2008)
More Than $170,000 in Questioned Costs at a 
Job Corps Center in North Carolina 
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The goal of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) is to increase employment, retention, and earnings of 
program participants. The OIG has conducted numerous audits of the WIA program and its grantees since 
WIA’s enactment, including audits of state WIA expenditures, training and educational services provided 
to dislocated workers, and state-report performance data. The Department has implemented many of 
our recommendations to improve WIA program administration and performance. OIG investigations have 
resulted in the prosecution of individuals who illegally obtained WIA funds, denying eligible persons the 
benefi t from employment services. Our investigations have also documented confl ict-of-interest issues 
involving program administrators.
WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT
Des Moines City Councilman Guilty of 
Misapplying Job Training Funds
Joseph Archibald “Archie” Brooks Jr. pled guilty on October 19, 
2007, to conspiracy, fraud, and 
misapplication of funds from 
the job training and educational 
entity known as the Central 
Iowa Employment and Training 
Consortium (CIETC). Brooks, 
a former Des Moines city 
councilman and former chair of 
the CIETC board of directors, 
approved excessive and 
unreasonable compensation 
payments to several CIETC 
offi cials.
On March 26, 2008, a civil 
settlement agreement, separate 
from the criminal case, was 
entered into by the U.S. Attorney’s 
Offi ce, DOL, the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), and the State of Iowa, 
whereby the state agrees to repay 
$1.3 million dollars to the United 
States as a result of negotiations 
with the state over the alleged 
misappropriation of Federal funds 
provided to CIETC through WIA 
and the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families. 
In addition, Victor John 
Scaglione, a former CIETC 
employment specialist, was 
sentenced on December 7, 2007, 
to 16 months’ incarceration in 
connection with his conviction 
for making false statements to a 
Federal grand jury investigating 
the CIETC fraud case. Scaglione 
was convicted for making false 
declarations regarding accounting 
for his and other employees’ time 
and involvement in personal 
business, including, but not limited 
to, gambling activities while 
being compensated by CIETC. 
This is a joint investigation with 
the FBI, the Iowa State Auditor’s 
Offi ce, the Iowa Department of 
Public Safety, the Iowa Division 
of Criminal Investigation, and 
HHS-OIG. United States v. Victor 
John Scaglione (S.D. Iowa)
“Brooks, a former Des Moines city councilman and former chair of the 
CIETC board of directors, approved excessive and unreasonable compensation 
payments to several CIETC offi cials.”
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FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS
The Department’s foreign labor certifi cation programs allow U.S. employers to employ foreign labor 
to meet worker shortages. OIG investigations have revealed that the foreign labor certifi cation process 
continues to be compromised by unscrupulous attorneys, labor brokers, employers, and others.
Between December 2007 and February 2008, four conspirators who operated a Florida-based labor leasing company, 
Eurohouse Inc., were sentenced for their roles in 
defrauding the foreign labor certifi cation program 
by submitting fraudulent H-2B labor certifi cation 
applications. In addition to jail time, Justin King, 
Vyacheslav Finkel, Aleksander Berman, and Anna 
Czerwien are jointly and severally responsible for a 
$1 million judgment. Czerwien, president of Woland 
Inc. (formerly Eurohouse Inc.), also forfeited a 
residence and three vehicles.
In addition to defrauding DOL’s foreign labor 
certifi cation program, Eurohouse Inc. defrauded 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) from 2003 
to 2007 by preparing and submitting fraudulent 
ETA-750 applications for H-2B temporary foreign 
workers and nonimmigrant visa petitions for alien 
benefi ciaries. As a result of the fraud, approximately 
200 H-2B temporary alien workers illegally entered 
the United States and were leased as contract 
employees to various businesses in various 
unspecifi ed hourly job positions. Furthermore, 
the alien workers were charged excessive rent 
and transportation costs by Eurohouse for its 
services. The defendants also took advantage of 
the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina by 
fraudulently requesting and obtaining certifi cation 
from DOL for approximately 240 H-2B temporary 
foreign workers, purportedly on behalf of four New 
Orleans hotels. The defendants perpetrated the 
fraud without authorization or knowledge of the 
hotel entities listed as requesting the workers. 
This was a joint investigation with DOS-
Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) and the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 
United States v. Anna Czerwien and United States 
v. Aleksander Berman et al. (N.D. Florida)
Conspirators of Florida Labor Leasing 
Company Sentenced to Pay $1 Million
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Family Conspiracy Yields a Guilty Plea and 
Sentencing of Two Brothers
John Chikwon Hwang, owner and vice president of Brothers Construction Company (BCC), pled guilty on January 23, 2008, for 
his role in a conspiracy with his brothers, Chichan 
Hwang and Charlie Chiwon Hwang, and others to 
submit fraudulent labor certifi cation applications 
and related documents to DOL and other 
government agencies. The brothers submitted 
these fraudulent immigration-related documents 
in an effort to obtain green cards for foreign 
nationals. The Hwangs charged the individuals 
more than $27,000 to submit their visa applications. 
The brothers then arranged for BCC to provide 
paychecks to the individuals to fraudulently 
demonstrate to DHS and other Federal agencies 
purported employment with BCC. To this end, 
BCC generated more than $1.1 million in fi ctitious 
payroll. For his involvement in the scheme, Charlie 
Chiwon Hwang was sentenced on November 8, 
2007, to 21 months of imprisonment and 2 years 
of probation and was ordered to forfeit $250,000. 
This is a joint investigation with DOS-OIG, DOS-
DSS, DHS, FBI, and the Fairfax County (VA) Police 
Department. United States v. Charlie Chiwon 
Hwang (E.D. Virginia)
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Fruit Company Sentenced to Pay $500,000
Lochirco Fruit and Produce Inc. and Joette Reidy, a former offi cer of the company, were sentenced on February 7, 2008, for 
knowingly hiring and employing falsely documented 
workers. Lochirco’s sentence included two years’ 
probation and a $99,000 fi ne The company was 
given six months from the date of sentencing to pay 
$500,000 to ICE, to be forfeited in lieu of forfeiting real 
and personal property. Lochirco required a supply of 
laborers during the fall months at the orchard. As the 
volume of apple production increased, Reidy met 
the demand by hiring foreign nationals unauthorized 
for employment. By 2006, Lochirco was employing 
approximately sixty to seventy seasonal workers, 
many of whom were undocumented workers. This 
is a joint investigation with the DHS, ICE, and the 
Social Security Administration (SSA)-OIG. United 
States v. Lochirco Fruit and Produce Inc. d/b/a 
Happy Apples and United States v. Joette Reidy 
(E.D. Missouri)
California Attorneys Sentenced for Visa and 
Labor Certifi cation Fraud Scheme
Philip Abramowitz, an immigration attorney and partner with Los 
Angeles–based Korenberg, 
Abramowitz, and Feldun (KAF), 
was sentenced on March 24, 
2008, to, among other things, 
serve 21 months in Federal 
prison, pay a $650,000 monetary 
judgment, forfeit $184,904, and 
pay a fi ne of $100,000. 
Dan Korenberg and Steve 
Rodriguez, two senior KAF 
attorneys, were sentenced 
on March 10, 2008, for their 
respective roles in the same 
visa and labor certifi cation fraud 
scheme. Korenberg’s sentence 
included 24 months in Federal 
prison and a fi ne of $750,000. 
Korenberg and Rodriguez 
conspired with Abramowitz to sign 
and fi le fraudulent immigration 
petitions while directing KAF 
paralegals to become involved in 
the scheme. 
From 2000 through 2003, 
the defendants fi led fraudulent 
employment-based visa petitions 
on behalf of foreign nationals with 
DOL and the U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) 
who were seeking temporary 
work authorization or permanent 
residency in the United States. 
The defendants then applied for 
fraudulent work visas for those 
employees and paid them “off 
the books” until the visas were 
approved. 
In addition to the law fi rm, the 
probe targeted two employment 
agencies, Job Seekers International 
and Employmasters International. 
The investigation revealed that the 
employment agencies identifi ed 
employers, both real and fi ctitious, 
to attest that the aliens seeking 
work visas were being recruited 
for highly skilled jobs that often 
did not exist. In 2005, the owners 
of those employment agencies 
and one of their employees pled 
guilty to visa fraud and conspiracy 
charges. United States v. Phillip 
Dennis Abramowitz, United States 
v. Daniel E. Korenberg, and United 
States v. Steven James Rodriguez 
(C.D. California)
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P
aul Svejda, a 
former immigration 
c o n s u l t a n t , 
was sentenced 
on February 7, 2008, to 18 
months’ incarceration, followed 
by 2 years’ supervised release; 
forfeiture of $50,000; and 100 
hours of community service 
for his role in preparing 
and submitting hundreds of 
fraudulent labor condition 
applications and temporary 
employment–based visa 
petitions to DOL and USCIS. 
A second defendant, who is 
also charged with visa fraud, is 
currently a fugitive and is believed 
to reside in the United Kingdom.
Svejda set up more than 100 
shell companies to fi le a variety 
of fraudulent nonimmigrant visa 
applications, including labor 
condition applications and visa 
petitions for H-1B workers; L-1A 
(intracompany transferee) visa 
petitions; and E-2 (investor) 
visa petitions on behalf of his 
foreign clients. He charged these 
undocumented aliens between 
$5,000 and $20,000 for the visas 
and promised assistance in 
securing permanent residence 
cards (“green cards”). To mislead 
the approving offi cials, Svejda 
required his clients to transfer 
approximately $100,000 into a 
U.S. bank account in the name 
of the bogus corporations. In 
addition, he created bogus lease 
agreements and other fraudulent 
business records, such as sales 
contracts, income journals, 
invoices, payroll records, and tax 
returns, to support the fraudulent 
visa petitions. This was a joint 
investigation with ICE and the 
IRS. United States v. Paul Svejda 
(M.D. Florida)
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wo Los Angeles women, a Korean 
national, and a Maryland-based 
immigration services company were 
charged on December 17, 2007, 
with conspiring to submit false labor certifi cation 
applications and immigration petitions on behalf 
of foreign nationals applying for visas to enter 
the United States. Between 1997 and 2003, the 
defendants, who provided services to Korean 
and Chinese communities in several countries, 
allegedly submitted fraudulent immigration 
documents to assist foreign nationals in obtaining 
“green cards.” The defendants fi led false forms, 
bearing the names and identifying information of 
former clients, without their consent. Many of these 
clients had already attained the status of lawful 
permanent resident and, in some cases, citizenship. 
The defendants allegedly resubmitted the forms with 
the name of the new foreign national and information 
for fees ranging from $20,000 to $50,000. The 
indictment seeks forfeiture of $1 million, as well as 
property in Maryland. This is a joint investigation 
with ICE.
 26
Consultant Sentenced for Submitting Hun-
dreds of False Labor Applications
“He charged these undocumented aliens between $5,000 and 
$20,000 for the visas and promised assistance in securing per-
manent residence cards (“green cards”).”
Several Indicted in Falsifi cation of 
Labor Certifi cation Forms
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WORKER BENEFITS 
PROGRAMS
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS
The Department partners with states in administering a number of unemployment benefi t programs. 
One, the Federal-state Unemployment Insurance (UI), provides benefi ts to eligible workers who are 
unemployed because of a lack of suitable work and who meet eligibility requirements established by their 
respective state. UI benefi ts are fi nanced through employer taxes imposed by the states, which deposit 
the revenue in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund until needed to pay benefi ts.
Another program, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), is a federally funded program that provides 
income replacement to individuals who lose their jobs as a direct result of a major disaster and who are 
not eligible for any other UI benefi ts. OIG audits conducted after the 2005 hurricanes demonstrated the 
importance of effective controls to ensure that unemployment benefi ts reach only eligible persons.
Following the hurricanes in 2005, the OIG focused attention on administration of the DUA program. In 
addition to our audit work, the OIG actively performs criminal investigations and refers for prosecution 
cases that involve individuals who defraud unemployment benefi t programs. Recent investigations have 
documented the manner in which criminals steal identities to fi le for fraudulent UI benefi ts. 
Owner of Labor Leasing Company Defrauds 
Government of $1.45 Million
Phuong Hoai Ha, owner of a Philadelphia-based, labor leasing company known as F&S Personnel Inc. (F&S), pled guilty 
on March 11, 2008, to one count of conspiracy 
to defraud the government of UI, corporate, and 
personal income taxes, totaling more than $1 
million. F&S “leased” temporary laborers, who were 
recruited from the local South Asian community, to 
various client businesses on a weekly basis. The 
temporary workers performed low-skilled jobs, 
such as packaging and assembly line work. The 
company then paid the workers “under the table” 
in cash.
F&S entered into contracts that specifi cally 
indicated that the company bore the responsibility 
of collecting, accounting, and forwarding the 
payroll taxes of their employees to the appropriate 
Federal, state, and local authorities. However, Ha 
did not withhold or pay over the employment taxes, 
including UI, for employees. Instead he diverted 
approximately $900,000 in cash to pay for casino 
gambling, lavish cars, and diamond jewelry, among 
other things. Ha also did not require his employees 
to produce proper identifi cation necessary for the 
appropriate payroll accounting and payments to 
be made to taxing and insuring authorities. United 
States v. Phuong Ha (E.D. Pennsylvania)
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S Store Owner with Ties to Hezbollah Uses 
Fraudulent UI Proceeds to Fund 
Terrorist Group
Abdulla Kasem Ahmed Muthana pled guilty on November 16, 2007, for 
his role in using his business to 
launder approximately $350,000 
in proceeds from a UI scheme. 
As part of his plea, he agreed to 
forfeit approximately $220,306. 
From 2005 to 2007, Muthana 
operated the Ranchito Markets in 
Corcoran and Tulare, California, 
through which he laundered the 
monies. The store owner cashed 
scores of fraudulent UI checks, 
collected his transaction fee, and 
remitted the remaining amount in 
cash back to individuals who knew 
the UI check was fraudulent. 
On two separate occasions, 
Muthana agreed to send 
$55,000 and $80,000 to Bahrain, 
specifi cally to fund the Hezbollah 
militia in Lebanon. Muthana was 
arrested before completing the 
$80,000 transaction. This is a joint 
investigation with the Fresno FBI 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
and the California Employment 
Development Department (EDD). 
United States v. Muthana (E.D. 
California)
Counterfeiters of UI Checks Plead Guilty
James Moya and Rosemary Almada pled guilty on November 16, 2007, and February 8, 2008, respectively, for their roles in a 
counterfeit UI check scheme. Moya and Almada 
conspired with others to create more than 240 
counterfeit U.S. Treasury checks, California UI checks, 
and disability insurance checks that were cashed at 
66 different businesses. Methamphetamine addicts 
throughout the Los Angeles and Orange County, 
California, area were recruited by the conspirators 
to cash the checks. 
The check cashers, who split the proceeds of 
the checks with the counterfeiters, initially cashed 
the counterfeit checks by using their actual names, 
addresses, and driver’s licenses. After a few of 
the check cashers were arrested by local police 
departments, the counterfeiter made fake driver’s 
licenses with the photographs of the check cashers, 
using names and addresses taken from stolen 
mortgage applications. The counterfeiter then made 
the checks payable to the check cashers with the 
fake driver’s licenses. 
This is a joint investigation with the U.S. Postal 
Inspection Service (USPIS), SSA-OIG, California 
EDD, and the U.S. Secret Service. United States v.
James Ernest Moya, Rosemary Almada, et al. (C.D. 
California)
Georgia Woman Indicted for UI Fraud 
in Three States
A Georgia woman and fi ve other co-defendants were 
indicted on January 8, 2008, 
for state violations concerning 
racketeering related to a UI fraud 
scheme amounting to $204,608. 
Two of these defendants were 
sentenced in March to 10 years’ 
probation and were ordered to 
pay a total of nearly $14,000 in 
restitution. 
The defendants allegedly 
created fi ctitious employer 
entities and paid benefi ts to 
approximately 47 ineligible UI 
claimants, 38 of whom received 
benefi ts through the use of 
stolen Social Security numbers. 
A signifi cant portion of the stolen 
funds were purportedly deposited 
onto prepaid credit cards. The 
defendant allegedly engaged in 
similar schemes in Arkansas and 
Missouri. In a separate scheme, 
the main defendant used her 
tax preparation and accounting 
service business to prepare 
infl ated tax returns in 2005 and 
2006 through which she received 
kickbacks. 
This is an ongoing case with 
the Douglas County (Georgia) 
Sheriff’s Offi ce.
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STen Individuals Indicted for Obtaining 
Confi dential UI Information
T en individuals were indicted on December 5, 2007, by a Federal grand jury in connection with a pretexting 
scheme to illegally obtain confi dential information 
from State Workforce Agencies, SSA, and IRS on 
more than 12,000 U.S. citizens. Charges included 
conspiracy, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, 
and solicitation of Federal tax information. 
Private investigators across the country 
allegedly obtained confi dential information 
that included state employment/wage, Federal 
tax, Social Security and medical/pharmacy 
records. They were hired by attorneys, insurance 
companies, and collection agencies to investigate 
the background of opposing parties, witnesses, 
and benefi t claimants, as well as to uncover assets 
or income in return for fees ranging from $30 to 
$300. 
This is an ongoing investigation with the 
Washington Employment Security Department, 
SSA-OIG, and the U.S. Treasury Inspector General 
for Tax Administration.
Convenience Store Owner Indicted for UI 
Check Cashing Scheme
A California owner of a convenience store was indicted on December 20, 2007, for her role in a UI scheme in which she allegedly cashed UI checks that she knew were obtained fraudulently. The store owner charged an infl ated check-cashing service fee of up to 50 percent of the total 
amount and deposited the checks into bank accounts that she controlled. The checks purportedly were 
obtained using the identities of hundreds of unknowing individuals. This is an ongoing investigation with 
California EDD.
“Private investigators across the country allegedly obtained confi dential information 
that included state employment/wage, Federal tax, Social Security and medical/
pharmacy records.”
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S WAGE AND HOUR PROGRAMS
The Davis-Bacon Act and related acts, such as the Copeland “Anti-Kickback” Act, require the payment of 
prevailing wage rates and fringe benefi ts on federally fi nanced or assisted construction. The OIG selectively 
focuses on investigating violations by contractors engaged in Federal construction projects who submit 
falsifi ed certifi ed payroll records in violation of the Copeland Act.
Former Company Vice President Defrauds 
Government in Contracts Worth $121 Million
Construction Company Owner Defrauds Fed in 
9/11 Reconstruction of Pentagon
Thomas Cousar, the owner of CAPCO Contracting Inc., pled guilty on February 20, 2008, to mail fraud, major fraud against the 
Federal government, and conspiracy to defraud the 
U.S. government for two separate schemes in which 
he falsifi ed invoices related to the construction of a 
baseball park, a university sports complex, and the 
reconstruction of the Pentagon following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Catherine Bradica, a 
CAPCO fi nancial offi cer, pled guilty on February 19, 
2008, to the same charges, and Daniel Monte, a CAPCO 
employee, pled guilty to the conspiracy charge.
From 1999 through 2001, CAPCO was paid on a 
“time and material” basis for the construction of the 
Pittsburgh Pirates Professional Baseball Park 
and the Peterson Event Center. In violation of 
the Copeland Act, Cousar and Bradica falsifi ed 
required certifi ed payrolls by overreporting regular 
and overtime hours worked and by adding names 
of individuals who had not worked on the job for 
those specifi c days and hours. In addition, Cousar 
and Bradica indicated that employees were paid 
overtime rates when actually the employees 
received straight hourly rates in the form of 
expense checks. CAPCO was bound by CBAs to 
remit reports and payments for work performed 
by union employees. 
During the reconstruction of the Pentagon, 
Dennis F. Campbell, the former vice president of 
Schuylkill Products Inc. (SPI), 
pled guilty on February 13, 
2008, for his role in a pattern of 
fraudulent activity that allowed 
SPI to be awarded $121 million 
in federally funded highway 
construction contracts over a 
14-year period. The scheme 
involved 347 disadvantaged 
business enterprise (DBE) 
subcontracts on bridge 
projects awarded through the 
Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation (PENNDOT). 
Campbell was one of the East 
Coast’s largest manufacturers 
of concrete bridge beams used 
in highway construction projects. 
Campbell, along with four other 
co-conspirators, used Marikina 
Construction Corporation (Marikina), 
a Filipino-owned company based 
in Connecticut, to obtain DBE 
subcontracts on federally funded 
construction jobs that were 
actually performed, managed, and 
supervised by employees of SPI 
and CDS Engineers Inc. (CDS), a 
sister company of SPI. 
Between 1994 and 2007, Marikina 
became PENNDOT’s largest 
recipient of DBE-designated funds. 
SPI and CDS offi cials prepared 
phony certifi ed payroll reports to the 
general contractor and DOL, falsely 
indicating that Marikina employees 
performed the work.
 Furthermore, Campbell and 
his co-conspirators fraudulently 
caused the award of Federal 
contracts to Marikina by creating 
the illusion that the company would 
perform a “commercially useful 
function” on the subcontract. 
Campbell and others fraudulently 
induced PENNDOT to certify 
and recertify Marikina as a DBE 
by means of false and fi ctitious 
representations regarding the 
management, control, and 
independence of Marikina. 
This was a joint investigation 
with the FBI and DOT-OIG. United 
States v. Dennis F. Campbell 
(M.D. Pennsylvania)
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“During the reconstruction of the Pentagon, Cousar, Bradica, and 
Monte used a billing scheme that falsely overreported labor hours 
and materials.”
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Shortcomings Existed in Emergency Planning 
and Communication at New Orleans 
Wage and Hour Division Offi ce
Cousar, Bradica, and Monte used a billing scheme 
that falsely overreported labor hours and materials. 
They also diverted material from the Pentagon 
reconstruction job to other CAPCO projects. AMEC 
Construction Management Inc. (AMEC) was the 
general contractor for the Pentagon reconstruction 
project, and CAPCO was a subcontractor. 
From 2001 through 2002, CAPCO was paid on a 
“time and material” basis by AMEC. Cousar, Bradica, 
and an AMEC project supervisor, Joseph Arena 
Jr., conspired to conceal their personal relationship 
and CAPCO payments for the personal benefi t of 
Arena. Arena was responsible for reviewing invoices 
At the request of the Chairman of the House Domestic Policy 
Subcommittee, we conducted an 
audit of Employment and Standards 
Administration’s (ESA’s) Wage and 
Hour Division (WHD) offi ce in New 
Orleans to determine how well it 
processed workers’ complaints in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
We focused on staffi ng, intake 
procedures by which workers 
fi le complaints, communication 
with complainants, and outreach 
activities. 
We determined that the New 
Orleans Offi ce was adequately 
staffed by detailing additional 
investigators, including Spanish- 
and Portuguese-speaking 
investigators. However, we found 
that WHD does not have an 
emergency plan for addressing 
how it would serve the New 
Orleans’ workforce or the workforce 
in other metropolitan areas in the 
Southwest if a situation similar to 
Hurricane Katrina were to occur 
again. 
We also found that the New 
Orleans Offi ce did not adequately 
communicate with complainants 
in 11 of the 30 cases we reviewed, 
with lapses in communication 
averaging about fi ve months. 
Finally, the New Orleans Offi ce 
performed community outreach 
and attempted to establish 
relationships within the community 
to assist the offi ce in gathering and 
investigating worker complaints. 
While these efforts produced few 
complaints or investigations, the 
New Orleans Offi ce did conduct 
more directed investigations – 
402 directed investigations in FY 
2007 compared with 58 directed 
investigations in FY 2005. 
We could not determine whether 
the New Orleans Offi ce’s intake 
procedures impeded workers’ 
ability to fi le complaints because 
the offi ce did not maintain a record 
of all the inquiries it received. As 
a result, the New Orleans Offi ce 
was unable to demonstrate the 
correctness of its decisions on 
those inquiries that it had decided 
were not violations or were outside 
of WHD’s jurisdiction.
We made three 
recommendations to ESA: 
ensure that WHD’s Continuity 
of Operations Plan specifi cally 
addresses how the workforce 
would be served in the event of 
a disaster; direct WHD district 
offi ces to maintain a record 
of all inquiries received; and 
ensure that WHD investigators 
comply with the policy on 
regular communication with 
complainants and document 
those communications in 
the case fi le. ESA agreed 
to improve the agency’s 
Continuity of Operations Plan 
and to reaffi rm its procedures 
for regular communication with 
complainants. 
However, ESA did not agree to 
maintain a record of all inquiries 
received, stating that doing 
so would prove detrimental 
to WHD’s ability to provide 
assistance to employees who 
may be reluctant to complain. 
(Report Number 04-08-002-04-
420; issued March 31, 2008)
“We found that WHD does not have an emergency plan for addressing how it would serve 
the New Orleans’ workforce or the workforce in other metropolitan areas in the Southwest if a 
situation similar to Hurricane Katrina were to occur again.”
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and change orders submitted by CAPCO to AMEC. 
Cousar, Bradica, and Arena further attempted to 
conceal unethical conduct by providing the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD)-OIG with a fraudulent 
invoice and personal check. Arena previously pled 
guilty to conspiracy in October 2006. 
This is a joint investigation with IRS-Criminal 
Investigative Service (CID), DoD-Defense Criminal 
Investigative Service (DCIS), DoD-Defense Contract 
Audit Agency (DCAA), USPIS, and FBI. United States 
v. Thomas Cousar; Catherine Bradica; Daniel Monte; 
and Joseph Arena (W.D. Pennsylvania)
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S OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
The Employment and Standards Administration’s Offi ce of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) 
administers the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) program and three other disability 
compensation programs, which provide wage replacement benefi ts, medical treatment, vocational 
rehabilitation, and other benefi ts to certain workers for work-related injuries or occupational disease. The 
FECA benefi ts are charged to the employing Federal agencies that rely upon OWCP to adjudicate claims 
eligibility and to pay compensation benefi ts and medical expenses. OWCP has similar responsibilities for 
Black Lung, Longshore and Harbor Workers, and Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 
programs fi nanced by a combination of Federal and industry funds.
Plastic Surgeon Sentenced in DOL Fraud in 
Excess of $1 Million
Richard Coin, a hand surgeon who specialized in plastic surgery, and his company, Reconstructive Microsurgery 
Associates (RMA), were sentenced on February 
15, 2008, for demands against the United States 
and health care fraud, respectively. Coin’s 
sentence included 2 years’ probation, 100 hours 
of community service, and a $20,000 fi ne. RMA’s 
sentence included 2 years’ probation, a $1.1 
million fi ne, and $400,000 in restitution to victims. 
From  approximately 2001 to approximately 
2003, Coin directed RMA to prepare and submit 
falsifi ed operative reports, reimbursement claims, 
and other billing documents, totaling more than 
$1 million, to DOL for medical services allegedly 
provided to Federal employees and to private and 
public health care benefi t programs participants. 
RMA and its agents made fraudulent statements 
in patients’ medical records concerning the nature 
and severity of the patients’ injuries in order to 
justify medically unnecessary treatments and to 
secure higher reimbursement from insurers. They 
also fraudulently stated in reports and notes that 
surgical procedures had been performed that had 
not been provided. This is a joint investigation with 
the FBI and U.S. Postal Service (USPS)-OIG. 
United States v. Reconstructive and Microsurgery 
Associates Inc. and United States v. Richard E. 
Coin (E.D. Missouri)
Martin McLaren, a medical doctor who owned and 
operated a clinic, pled guilty on 
February 13, 2008, to charges 
of health care fraud for his role 
in a scheme through which 
he and his company, Pain 
Management Center (PMC), 
defrauded a number of health 
benefi t programs, including 
OWCP, the Medicare program, 
the District of Columbia’s Medicaid 
program, and the Federal Employee 
Health Benefi ts Program. As part of 
his guilty plea, McLaren agreed to 
pay a total of $5 million to settle the 
criminal restitution, forfeiture, and 
civil aspects of the case.
From 2000 to 2006, McLaren, who 
controlled all aspects of PMC billing, 
invoiced the above health benefi t 
programs for medical services 
that were not performed. He billed 
for services that PMC did not 
have the necessary equipment 
to perform the procedure, and, 
billed for patient consultations he 
did not provide. 
This is an ongoing 
investigation with the FBI, HHS-
OIG, and the Offi ce of Personnel 
Management-OIG. United States 
v. Martin McLaren (D. District of 
Columbia)
Health Care Physician Pleads Guilty 
to Defrauding FECA
Postal Employee Collects FECA Checks While 
Operating Several Businesses
David Van Deusen, a former USPS employee, was sentenced on January 2, 2008, to 18 months in prison and 3 
years’ probation and was ordered to pay $392,863 
in restitution and a $100 special assessment, as 
a result of his previous guilty plea to one count 
of FECA fraud. While he received workers 
compensation benefi ts due to back injuries that 
occurred in 1988 and 1991, Van Deusen operated 
several businesses from his home, including used-
auto sales, paving and blacktop sealing, and sign 
manufacturing. He failed to report these business 
activities and the income earned to OWCP as 
required. This was a joint investigation with the 
USPS-OIG. United States v. David P. Van Deusen 
(N.D. New York) 33
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Daryl Engelhardt, a former USPS letter carrier, was found guilty on December 18, 2007, of mail fraud and false statements for failing to report income as required. After reportedly injuring his back in 2001 while working as a letter carrier, he went on total 
disability in 2005. During the summer of 2006, Engelhardt worked in Michigan at numerous fairs and 
carnivals by tattooing and giving aura readings. He was also observed carrying equipment, lifting heavy 
objects, jogging, bending, twisting, and sitting and standing for extended periods of time.  Furthermore, 
Engelhardt falsifi ed DOL documents regarding his employment activities.  This is a joint investigation with 
USPS-OIG. United States v. Daryl Engelhardt (E.D. Michigan)
Letter Carrier Worked as “Carnie” as He 
Defrauded DOL Program
Man Charged with Stealing Deceased Aunt’s 
FECA Checks
A Maryland resident was charged on November 28, 2007, with stealing more than $92,588 in FECA benefi ts from his deceased aunt, who is a former recipient of FECA survivor payments.  From 1999 to 2004, the defendant allegedly forged his aunt’s signatures on her FECA benefi ciary checks. He 
then deposited the forged FECA checks into a joint account that he maintained with his aunt.  Prior to her 
death, the defendant had power of attorney that he used to assist his aunt in managing her affairs.  This is 
a joint investigation with the Maryland State Police.
Former Senate Employee Allegedly Raced Cars 
While Collecting FECA Checks
A former U.S. Senate employee was indicted on November 8, 2007, for fraud against the FECA program, totaling $51,512.  The FECA recipient, who suffered a knee injury in 1989 while employed as a temporary cable installer, claimed, among other things, that he was unable to operate a 
vehicle.  The indictment alleges that the former Federal employee entered and won cash prizes from various 
car-racing events in several states beginning in 1998.  The FECA recipient also allegedly worked as a 
director of operations for a Maryland-based security company.  This is a joint investigation with the FBI.
Gladys L. Hinerman, a resident of Coal Center, Pennsylvania, was sentenced March 6, 2008, for her role in a 26-year scheme in which she defrauded the Division of Coal Mine Workers’ Compensation Black Lung Benefi ts Program of $129,453. 
Hinerman illegally negotiated Black Lung Program survivor’s widow benefi t checks intended for her 
mother. She achieved this by falsifying forms and stating that her mother was suffering from dementia when, 
in fact, her mother had died in 1980. United States v. Gladys L. Hinerman (N.D. Ohio)
Woman Defrauds Black Lung Benefi ts Act 
Program for 26 Years
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The Department received an 
unqualifi ed opinion on its annual 
consolidated fi nancial statements 
for the 11th consecutive year. 
The OIG contracted with KPMG 
LLP to audit these statements, 
In considering internal control over fi nancial reporting, the 
auditors identifi ed four conditions from prior years as being 
signifi cant defi ciencies; however, none of the signifi cant 
defi ciencies were believed to be material weaknesses.  These four 
outstanding signifi cant defi ciencies from prior years, as detailed 
below, continue to require management’s attention:
1. Lack of Adequate Controls over Access to Key Financial and
 Support Systems
2. Weakness Noted over Payroll Accounting
3. Weakness Noted over Budgetary Accounting
4. Lack of Segregation of Duties over Journal Entries
T he OIG has been reporting access con-trol weaknesses over the Department’s fi nancial systems since FY 2001 and ap-
plication access control weaknesses since FY 2004. 
In FY 2006, we identifi ed two conditions relating to 
system access controls over fi nancial reporting: lack 
of strong application controls over access to and 
protection of fi nancial information and lack of strong 
logistical security controls to secure DOL’s networks 
and information. During the FY 2007 audit, we noted 
that 51 prior-year, agency-specifi c recommenda-
tions addressing access controls had not been cor-
rected. 
We noted issues with account management, con-
SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES
DOL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS RECEIVE UNQUALIFIED 
OPINION FOR 11TH CONSECUTIVE YEAR
1. Lack of Adequate Controls over Access to Key Financial and 
Support Systems
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DEPARTMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT
and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP (PwC) to support KPMG 
with audit testing. KPMG 
issued an unqualifi ed opinion and 
concluded that DOL’s fi nancial 
statements were presented fairly, 
in all material respects, in confor-
mity with U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
OUTSTANDING SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES
fi guration management, and review of system audit 
logs across various DOL agencies in our FY 2007 
testing of DOL’s IT systems, each of which could 
adversely affect DOL’s ability to initiate, authorize, 
record, process, or report DOL fi nancial data. 
The FY 2007 audit’s testing resulted in 112 new 
recommendations related to access controls. The 
new weaknesses detected during FY 2007 and 
the prior-year control weaknesses represent a 
signifi cant defi ciency over access to key fi nan-
cial and support systems. Collectively, these 
weaknesses include defi ciencies in key security 
and system software controls that directly impact 
access to fi nancial systems. 35
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2. Weakness Noted over Payroll Accounting
During FYs 2006 and 2007, the U.S. Depart-ment of Agriculture’s 
Offi ce of the Chief Financial Of-
fi cer (OCFO) National Finance 
Center (NFC) processed DOL’s 
payroll. The USDA-OIG reported 
a qualifi ed opinion regarding the 
effectiveness of NFC’s internal 
controls in both fi scal years. 
Our FY 2006 audit found that 
DOL did not have policies and 
procedures in place to reconcile 
the payroll information it submitted 
to NFC to the information received 
3. Weakness Noted over Budgetary Accounting
For FY 2006, we reported that the OCFO did not complete timely rec-onciliations related to the Apportion-
ment and Reapportionment Schedules (SF-
132) and the Report on Budget Execution and 
Budgetary Resources (SF-133). We recom-
mended that DOL management ensure that 
current policies and procedures regarding SF-
132 and SF-133 reconciliations are enhanced 
to require that quarterly reconciliations be pre-
pared and documented; ensure the comple-
tion of documented supervisory reviews over 
the reconciliations; and ensure the completion 
of these procedures by a certain date. 
During our FY 2007 audit, we requested 
quarterly reconciliations of the SF-132 to the 
SF-133. However, the fi rst quarter recon-
ciliation was not completed, and the second 
quarter reconciliation was not provided until 
June 2007. In addition, these reconciliations 
identifi ed several nec-essary corrections to 
amounts posted in the general ledger, and 
various differences remainedunresolved. We 
also requested reconciliation of the FY 2006 
Statement of Budgetary Resources to the 
FY 2006 President’s Budget of the United 
States; however, we noted the reconciliation 
was not reviewed in a timely manner. In FY 
2006 and FY 2007, the OCFO did not have ad-
equate resources and did not adequately enforce 
policies to ensure the reconciliations were complet-
ed and any identifi ed reconciling items resolved in 
and processed by NFC. 
As part of DOL’s correc-
tive action plan for FY 2007, a
 Reconciliation Report was de-
veloped for reconciling informa-
tion sent to NFC to information 
received and processed by NFC. 
In March 2007, the Department’s 
OCFO issued policies and pro-
cedures stating that each DOL 
human resource offi ce should 
review these reports each pay 
period and resolve differences 
identifi ed.  However, no offi ces 
we tested had complied with 
these new procedures, although 
two offi ces performed their own 
reconciliation procedures. 
The lack of Department-
wide reconciliation controls, 
compounded by the control 
weaknesses identifi ed at NFC, 
increase the risk that the FY 2007 
fi nancial statements could be 
misstated due to errors in payroll 
processing by NFC.
a timely manner. The lack of timely and complete 
reconciliations increases the risk that material dif-
ferences in external reports and in the general 
ledger may not be detected and corrected in a 
timely manner.  
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4. Lack of Segregation of Duties over Journal Entries
During the FY 2006 audit, we noted that accounting staff from 
all DOL agencies were able to 
prepare and enter journal en-
tries into the Department of 
Labor Accounting Related Sys-
tems (DOLAR$) 
without approv-
al. By allowing 
individuals the 
authority to pre-
pare and ap-
prove their own 
transactions in DOLAR$, there 
is an increased risk that a mate-
rial error would not be prevented, 
or detected and corrected, in a 
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timely manner. 
We recommended that man-
agement reconfi gure DOLAR$ 
so that journal entries are re-
quired to be approved by an in-
dividual other than the preparer 
and that agencies implement 
manual reviews until system 
controls have been implement-
ed. During the FY 2007 audit, we 
found that management had not 
made the recommended changes 
to DOLAR$. 
During the second quarter of 
FY 2007, the OCFO had devel-
oped department-wide manual 
policies and procedures designed 
to ensure the segregation of jour-
nal entry preparation 
and approval authority. 
However, our test of 
21 sample journal en-
tries from October 1, 
2006, through June 30, 
2007, noted that 16 of 
the journal entries did not have 
supporting documentation evi-
dencing management review and 
approval.
37 
“By allowing individuals the authority to prepare and 
approve their own transactions ... there is an increased 
risk that a material error would not be prevented, or 
detected ...”
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The Inspector General Act requires the OIG to review existing or proposed legislation and regulations 
and to make recommendations in the Semiannual Report concerning their impact on the economy and 
effi ciency of the Department’s programs and on the prevention of fraud and abuse.
Allow DOL Access to Wage Records
To reduce overpayments in employee benefi t 
programs, including UI and FECA, the Department 
and the OIG need legislative authority to easily and 
expeditiously access state UI wage records, SSA 
wage records, and employment information from 
the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH), which 
is maintained by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services. The DOL and the SSA currently have 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in place 
that allows State Workforce Agencies to access So-
cial Security data on individuals who apply for UI. 
The MOU is a good fi rst step. 
In addition, a provision in the State Unemploy-
ment Tax Authority (SUTA) Dumping Prevention Act 
of 2004 (Public Law 108-295) enables state agen-
cies responsible for the administration of unemploy-
ment compensa-tion programs to obtain access to 
the NDNH.  By cross-matching UI claims against 
this new-hire data, states can better detect over-
payments to UI claimants who have gone back to 
work but who continue to collect UI benefi ts. How-
ever, this law provides neither DOL nor the OIG 
with access to the NDNH. To make the new-hire 
data even more useful for this purpose, legislative 
action is needed requiring that employers report a 
new hire’s fi rst day of earnings and provide a clear, 
consistent, nationwide defi nition for this date. More-
over, access to SSA and UI data would allow the 
Department to measure the long-term impact of 
employment and training services on job retention 
and earnings. Outcome information of this type for 
program participants is otherwise diffi cult to obtain. 
Amend Pension Protection Laws
Expand the authority of EBSA to correct substandard benefi t plan audits and ensure that auditors 
with poor records do not perform additional plan audits. Changes should include providing EBSA 
with greater enforcement authority over registration, suspension, and debarment and the ability to levy 
civil penalties against employee benefi t plan auditors. The ability to correct substandard audits and take 
action against auditors is important because benefi t plan audits help protect participants and benefi ciaries 
by ensuring the proper value of plan assets and computation of benefi ts. 
Repeal ERISA’s limited-scope audit exemption. This provision excludes pension plan assets invested 
in banks, savings and loans, insurance companies, and the like from audits of employee benefi t plans. 
The limited scope prevents independent public accountants who are auditing pension plans from ren-
dering an opinion on the plans’ fi nancial statements in accordance with professional auditing standards. 
These “no opinion” audits provide no substantive assurance of asset integrity to plan participants or to 
the Department.
LEGISLATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Legislative changes to Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and criminal penalties for 
ERISA violations would enhance the protection of assets in pension plans. To this end, the OIG recommends 
the following: 
Require direct reporting of ERISA violations to DOL. Under current law, a pension plan auditor who 
fi nds a potential ERISA violation is responsible for reporting it to the plan administrator, but not directly to 
DOL. To ensure that improprieties are addressed, we recommend that plan administrators or auditors be 
required to report potential ERISA violations directly to DOL. This would ensure the timely reporting of viola-
tions and would more actively involve accountants in safeguarding pension assets, providing a fi rst line of 
defense against the abuse of workers’ pension plans. 
Strengthen criminal penalties in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Three sections of Title 18 serve as the primary 
criminal enforcement tools for protecting pension plans covered by ERISA. Embezzlement or theft from em-
ployee pension and welfare plans is prohibited by Section 664, making false statements in documents required 
by ERISA is prohibited by Section 1027, and giving or accepting bribes related to the operation of ERISA-cov-
ered plans is outlawed by Section 1954. Sections 664 and 1027 subject violators to 5 years’ imprisonment, while 
Section 1954 calls for up to 3 years’ imprisonment. We believe that raising the maximum penalties to 10 years 
for all three violations would serve as a greater deterrent and would further protect employee pension plans.
Provide Authority to Ensure the Integrity of the 
Foreign Labor Certifi cation Process
If DOL is to have a meaningful 
role in the H-1B specialty occu-
pations foreign labor certifi cation 
process, it must have the statu-
tory authority to ensure the in-
tegrity of that process, including 
the ability to verify the accuracy 
of information provided on labor 
condition applications. Currently, 
DOL is statutorily required to 
certify such applications unless 
it determines them to be “incom-
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plete or obviously inaccurate.” 
Our concern with the Depart-
ment’s limited ability to ensure 
the integrity of the certifi cation 
process is heightened by the re-
sults of OIG analysis and inves-
tigations that show the program 
is susceptible to signifi cant fraud 
and abuse, particularly by em-
ployers and attorneys. 
The OIG also recommends 
that ETA should seek the author-
ity to bar employers and others 
who submit fraudulent applica-
tions to the foreign labor certifi ca-
tion program.
The OIG recommends that 
DOL consider, in conjunction with 
USCIS, a legislative proposal that 
would require foreign nationals to 
have their eligibility determined 
by USCIS before the employer’s 
labor certifi cation application is 
reviewed by DOL. 
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Enhance the WIA 
Program Through 
Reauthorization
The reauthorization of the WIA 
provides an opportunity to revise 
WIA programs to better achieve 
their goals. Based on our audit 
work, the OIG recommends the 
following: 
LE
G
IS
LA
TI
VE
 R
EC
O
M
M
EN
D
AT
IO
N
S 
Improve state and local reporting of WIA obligations. A disagreement between ETA and the states 
about the level of funds available to states drew attention to the way WIA obligations and expenditures 
are reported. The OIG’s prior work in nine states and Puerto Rico showed that obligations provide a more 
useful measure for assessing states’ WIA funding status if obligations accurately refl ect legally committed 
funds and are consistently reported.
Modify WIA to encourage the participation of training providers. WIA participants use individual 
training accounts to obtain services from approved eligible training providers. However, performance 
reporting and eligibility requirements for training providers have made some potential providers unwilling 
to serve WIA participants.
Support amendments to resolve uncertainty about the release of WIA participants’ personally 
identifying information for WIA reporting purposes. Some training providers are hesitant to disclose 
participant data to states for fear of violating the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act.
Strengthen incumbent worker guidance to states. Currently no Federal criteria defi ne how long an 
employer must be in business or an employee must be employed to qualify as an incumbent worker, 
and no Federal defi nition of eligible individual exists for incumbent worker training. Consequently, a state 
could decide that any employer or employee can qualify for a WIA-funded incumbent worker program.
Improve the Integrity of the FECA Program
The OIG continues to support reforms to improve the integrity of the FECA program. Implementing the 
following changes would result in signifi cant savings for the Federal government:
Move claimants into a form of retirement after a certain age if they are still injured.
Return a 3-day waiting period to the beginning of the 45-day continuation-of-pay process 
to require employees to use accrued sick leave or leave without pay before their benefi ts 
begin.
Grant authority to DOL to directly and routinely access Social Security wage records in 
order to identify claimants defrauding the program.
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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
Section 4(a)(2)—Review of Legislation and Regulation  .............................................  38
Section 5(a)(1)—Signifi cant Problems, Abuses, and Defi ciencies  ...........................  ALL
Section 5(a)(2)—Recommendations with Respect to Signifi cant 
Problems, Abuses, and Defi ciencies  ........................................................................  ALL
Section 5(a)(3)—Prior Signifi cant Recommendations on Which 
Corrective Action Has Not Been Completed ...............................................................  46
Section 5(a)(4)—Matters Referred to Prosecutive Authorities ....................................  48
Section 5(a)(5) and Section 6(b)(2)—Summary of Instances Where 
Information Was Refused  .....................................................................................  NONE
Section 5(a)(6)—List of Audit Reports  ........................................................................  43
Section 5(a)(7)—Summary of Signifi cant Reports ....................................................  ALL
Section 5(a)(8)—Statistical Tables on Management Decisions on Questioned Costs   42
Section 5(a)(9)—Statistical Tables on Management Decisions on 
Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use  .................................................  42
Section 5(a)(10)—Summary of Each Audit Report over Six Months Old for 
Which No Management Decision Has Been Made  ....................................................  46
Section 5(a)(11)—Description and Explanation for Any Signifi cant Revised 
Management Decision  ..........................................................................................  NONE
Section 5(a)(12)—Information on Any Signifi cant Management Decisions with 
Which the Inspector General Disagrees  ...............................................................  NONE
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FUNDS PUT TO BETTER USE AGREED TO BY DOL
Number
of Reports 
Dollar Value 
($ millions) 
For which no management decision had been made as of commencement of 
reporting period 2 1.2
Issued during the reporting period 0 0
Total 2 1.2
FUNDS PUT TO BETTER USE IMPLEMENTED BY DOL
Number of 
Reports 
Dollar Value 
($ millions) 
For which final action had not been taken as of commencement of reporting 
period 5 438.5
For which management or appeal decisions were made during reporting period 0 0
Total 5 438.5
QUESTIONED COSTS
Number
of Reports 
Questioned
Costs ($ 
millions)
For which no management decision had been made as of commencement of 
the reporting period (as adjusted) 
29 47.4
Issued during the reporting period  12 134.0
Total 41 181.4
For which a management decision was made during the reporting period: 
Dollar value of disallowed costs  6.6
Dollar value of costs not disallowed 15.8
For which no management decision had been made as of end of reporting 
period
23 159.0
DISALLOWED COSTS
Number
of Reports 
Disallowed
Costs ($ 
millions)
For which final action had not been taken as of commencement of reporting 
period (as adjusted)1 86 35.1
For which management or appeal decisions were made during reporting period 14 6.9
Total 100 42.0
For which final action was taken during reporting period: 
Dollar value of disallowed costs that were recovered 18.2
Dollar value of disallowed costs that were written off by management  0.5
Dollar value of disallowed costs that entered appeal status 0.3
For which no final action had been taken by the end of reporting period 71 23.0
1 These figures are provided by DOL agencies and are unaudited. Do not include $2.8 million of disallowed costs that are 
under appeal. Partial recovery/write-offs are reported in the period in which they occur. Therefore, many audit reports 
will remain open awaiting final recoveries/write-offs to be recorded. 
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FINAL AUDIT AND ATTESTATION REPORTS ISSUED
Program Name
Name of Report 
# of Nonmonetary  
Recommendations Questioned Costs  
($)
Other
Monetary 
Impact  
($)
Employment and Training Programs 
Job Corps Program 
Performance Audit of Schenck Job Corps Center; Report No. 26-08-002-01-370; 
03/21/08 13 171,719 0
Complaint Involving the Tulsa Job Corps Center; Report No. 26-08-003-01-370; 
03/13/08 3 0 0
Older Workers Program
Single Audit: Quality Career Services; Report No. 24-08-503-03-360; 03/20/08 1 0 0
Workforce Investment Act
Single Audit: State of New York; Report No. 24-08-504-03-390; 03/25/08 1 2,945,825 0
Single Audit: Institute for GIS Studies Inc.; Report No. 24-08-505-03-390; 03/20/08 4 0 0
Single Audit: The Church United for Community Development; Report No. 24-08-500-
03-390; 03/07/08 3 0 0
Single Audit: Operation Hope Inc.; Report No. 24-08-501-03-390; 03/07/08 1 0 0
Single Audit: South Florida Workforce; Report No. 24-08-502-03-390; 03/07/08 2 0 0
Consortium for Worker Education Earmark Grant; Report. No. 02-08-203-03-390; 
02/29/08 3 11,264,554 0
Single Audit: The Community Transportation Development Center; Report No. 21-08-
519-03-390; 01/17/08 1 0 0
Single Audit: AFL-CIO Working for America Institute Inc.; Report No. 21-08-516-03-
390; 01/10/08 4 0 0
Single Audit: The Navajo Nation; Report No. 21-08-513-03-390; 01/10/08 3 0 0
Single Audit: Metro United Methodist Urban Ministry; Report No. 21-08-508-03-390; 
11/14/07 1 0 0
Single Audit: Oregon Manufacturing Extension Partnership; Report No. 21-08-509-03-
390; 11/14/07 10 0 0
High Growth Job Training Initiative: Decisions for Non-Competitive Awards Not 
Adequately Justified; Report No. 02-08-201-03-390; 11/02/07 7 0 34,000,000
Single Audit: Futures through Training Inc.; Report. No. 21-08-507-03-390; 11/01/07  1 0 0
Single Audit: Government of Guam; Report No. 21-08-501-03-390; 10/02/07 8 26,988 0
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Single Audit: Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Growth; Report No. 21-
08-502-11-111; 10/16/07  1 1,109,350 0
Goal Totals (18 Reports): 67 15,518,436 34,000,000
Worker Benefit Programs 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Special Fund Financial 
Statements and Independent Auditors’ Report; Report No. 22-08-004-04-432; 
03/31/08 
1 0 0
District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act Special Fund Financial 
Statements and Independent Auditors’ Report; Report No. 22-08-005-04-432; 
03/31/08 
2 0 0
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act
Special Report Relating to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Special Benefit 
Fund; Report No. 22-08-001-04-431; 10/25/07 0 0 0
Goal Totals (3 Reports): 3 0 0
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Program Name
Name of Report 
# of Nonmonetary  
Recommendations Questioned Costs  
($)
Other
Monetary 
Impact  
($)
Worker Safety, Health, and Workplace Rights 
Mine Safety and Health
MSHA Could Not Show It Made the Right Decision in Approving the Roof Control 
Plan at Crandall Canyon Mine; Report No. 05-08-003-06-001; 03/31/08 9 0 0
Underground Coal Mine Inspection Mandate Not Fulfilled Due to Resource 
Limitations and Lack of Management Emphasis; Report No. 05-08-001-06-001; 
11/16/07 
7 0 0
MSHA’s Process for Determining Chargeability of Reported Fatalities Would 
Benefit from Additional Controls; Report No. 05-08-002-06-001; 11/14/07 7 0 0
Occupational Safety and Health 
Single Audit: Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Growth; Report No. 21-
08-503-10-001; 10/16/07 1 52,061 0
Wage and Hour
Audit of Wage and Hour New Orleans District Office’s Processing of Workers’ 
Complaints Received in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; Report No. 04-08-
002-04-420; 03/31/08 
3 0 0
Goal Totals (5 reports) 27 52,061 0
Departmental Management 
ETA Management 
Single Audit: Government of the District of Columbia; Report No. 21-08-514-03-
001; 01/10/08 6 184,655 0
Single Audit: Oglala Sioux Tribe; Report No. 21-07-515-03-001; 12/10/07 13 5,538,114 0
Single Audit: State of Louisiana; Report No. 21-08-511-03-001; 12/06/07 14 110,256,959 0
Single Audit: State of New Mexico Department of Labor; Report No. 21-08-510-03-
001; 11/21/07 25 0 0
Single Audit: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Report No. 21-08-512-03-001; 
11/21/07 9 1,023,738 0
Single Audit: State of Ohio; Report No. 21-08-506-03-001; 10/22/07 44 477,208 0
Single Audit: State of Illinois; Report No. 21-08-505-03-001; 10/16/07 17 882,118 0
Single Audit: Black Hills Special Services Corporation; Report No. 21-08-504-03-
001; 10/12/07 14 0 0
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management 
Results from the Audit of General, Application, and Security Controls for Selected 
DOL Information Technology Systems that Support the FY 2007 Financial 
Statements; Report No. 22-08-007-07-001; 03/31/08 
98 0 0
Office of the Chief Financial Officer
Management Advisory Comments Identified in an Audit of the Consolidated 
Financial Statements for the Year Ended September 30, 2007; Report No. 22-
08-006-13-001; 03/20/08 
17 0 0
Independent Auditors’ Report on the Department of Labor’s Fiscal Year 2007 
Financial Statements; Report No. 22-08-002-13-001; 11/13/07 3 0 0
Goal Totals (11 Reports) 260 118,362,792 0
Final Audit and Attestation Report Totals (37 Reports) 357 133,933,289 34,000,000
NOTE: All single audit reports shown in the above schedule represent audits of states, local governments, and nonprofit 
organizations conducted, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, by independent 
public accounting firms and/or state and local government auditors under the Single Audit Act of 1984 and the 
Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996. Upon receipt of the single audit report, OIG reviews the report to identify 
findings and recommendations directed at DOL programs. OIG then issues a report to the funding agency that 
summarizes the DOL findings and recommendations and requests that the funding agency take resolution action 
on the recommendations within six months of the date of the OIG report.
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OTHER REPORTS ISSUED
Program Name
Name of Report # of Nonmonetary 
Recommendations 
Questioned
Costs
($)
Other
Monetary 
Impact
($)
Worker Benefit Programs 
Unemployment Insurance Program
Status of Recommendations—State of California Workforce Agency 
Unemployment Insurance Tax and Benefit System Security Audit; Report 
No. 23-08-001-03-315; 03/17/08 
0 0 0
Goal Totals 0 0 0
Departmental Management 
Multiagency Programs
Significant DOL Unimplemented Recommendations (Congressional Request); 
Report. No. 25-08-001-50-598; 01/31/08 0 0 0
Goal Totals 0 0 0
Other Report Totals (2 reports) 0 0 0
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UNRESOLVED AUDIT REPORTS OVER SIX MONTHS OLD
Agency/ 
Program Name of Audit 
# of 
Recommendations
Questioned
Costs ($) 
Nonmonetary Recommendations and Questioned Costs 
OIG Conducting Follow-up Work During FY 2008 Financial Statement Audits
CFO/Admin FY 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements; Report. No. 12-98-002-13-00; 
02/27/98
1 0
Final Management Decision Issued by Agency Did Not Resolve; OIG Negotiating with Program Agency 
ETA/TAA 
Performance Audit of Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) Bridge and Gap 
Programs; Report No. 02-05-204-03-330; 09/30/05 2 0
OASAM/DIRM Award and Management of Contracts for Encryption Software Were 
Significantly Flawed; Report No. 05-05-005-07-720; 03/31/05 1 0
MSHA/Admin 
MSHA Procurements Showed a Pattern of Disregard for Federal and 
Department of Labor Acquisition Rules and Requirements; Report No. 25-
05-001-06-00; 10/29/04
1 0
MSHA/Admin 
Coal Mine Hazardous Condition Complaint Process Should Be Strengthened; 
Report No. 05-06-006-06-00; 09/29/06 2 0
MSHA/Admin Coal Mine Safety and Health Accountability Program; Report No. 05-06-007-
06-00; 09/29/06 1 0
MSHA/Admin MSHA’s Office of Coal Mine Safety and Health Needs to Strengthen Its 
Accountability Program; Report No. 05-07-002-06-001; 08/24/07 2 0
OSEC/JCC 
Audit of Cincinnati Job Corps Center’s Student Leave and Unexcused 
Absences; Report No. 03-07-003-01-370; 03/30/07 3 208,121
OSEC/JCC 
Performance Audit of Oconaluftee Job Corps Center; Report No. 26-07-001-
01-370; 03/30/07 7 124,608
Issues Being Elevated to Department’s Audit Resolution Official 
ETA/WIA 
St. Charles Department of Workforce Development; Report No. 05-06-001-03-
390; 09/28/06 3 2,217,349
Final Management Decision Not Yet Issued; Agency Awaiting Response from Internal Revenue Service 
EBSA 
Improved Oversight of Cash Balance Plan Lump Sum Distributions Is Needed; 
Report No. 09-02-001-12-12; 03/29/02 2 0
Final Management Decision Not Issued; Agency Awaiting Response from Office of Management and Budget 
MSHA/Admin MSHA Needs to Improve Controls over Performance Data; Report No. 22-07-008-06-001; 12/26/06 2 0
Final Management Decision Not Issued by Agency by Close of Period 
VETS/Admin Single Audit: State of Florida; Report No. 21-05-523-02-001; 03/24/05 2 245,226
VETS/Admin Single Audit: State of Florida; Report No. 21-07-533-02-001; 03/24/05 2 4,605
OSEC/JCC 
Single Audit: Future Entrepreneurs and Workers; Report No. 21-07-501-01-
370; 11/15/06 1 13,287
OSEC/JCC Cleveland Job Corps Center; Report No. 26-07-003-01-370; 09/28/07 5 344,175
ETA/WIA 
Questionable Eligibility of College Students in Mississippi’s National 
Emergency Grant Training Program; Report. No. 04-06-008-03-390; 
09/28/06
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Agency/ 
Program Name of Audit 
# of 
Recommendations
Questioned
Costs ($) 
Agency Has Requested Additional Time to Resolve 
ETA/JTPA 
Florida Performance-Based Incentive Program; Report No. 04-07-009-03-340; 
09/28/07 1 6,176,454
ETA/WIA Audit of San Diego Workforce Partnership Inc.; Report No. 09-07-001-03-390; 
02/14/07 17 14,192,002
ETA/WIA Single Audit: San Diego Workforce Partnership; Report. No. 21-07-522-03-
390; 03/14/07 6 0
Pending Appeal Decision 
OSEC/JCC 
Single Audit: YWCA of Greater Los Angeles; Report No. 21-06-543-01-370; 
08/16/06 12 0
ETA/WIA 
Westchester-Putnam County Consortium for Workers Education and Training 
Inc. Earmark Grant; Report. No. 02-06-204-03-390; 09/29/06 2 0
Total Nonmonetary Recommendations, Questioned Costs 78 23,525,827
Cost Efficiencies 
OSEC/JCC 
Performance Audit of Oconaluftee Job Corps Center; Report No. 26-07-001-
01-370; 03/30/07 1 190,367
ETA/WIA 
Audit of San Diego Workforce Partnership Inc.; Report No. 09-07-001-03-390; 
02/14/07 1 961,490
Total Cost Efficiencies 2 1,151,857
Total Audit Exceptions and Cost Efficiencies 80 24,677,684
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A
INVESTIGATIVE STATISTICS
Division
Totals
Totals
Cases Opened:  222
Program Fraud 162
Labor Racketeering 60
Cases Closed:  224 
Program Fraud 189
Labor Racketeering 35
Cases Referred for Prosecution:  147 
Program Fraud 112
Labor Racketeering 35
Cases Referred for Administrative/Civil Action:  94 
Program Fraud 71
Labor Racketeering 23
Indictments:  406 
Program Fraud 279
Labor Racketeering 127
Convictions:  253 
Program Fraud 182
Labor Racketeering 71
   
Debarments:  13 
Program Fraud 5  
Labor Racketeering 8  
Recoveries, Cost Efficiencies, Restitutions, Fines/Penalties, 
Forfeitures, and Civil Monetary Actions: $31,627,614 
Program Fraud $18,405,698  
Labor Racketeering $13,221,916  
Recoveries: The dollar amount/value of an agency’s action to recover or 
reprogram funds or to make other adjustments in response to OIG investigations
$3,480,184 
Cost-Efficiencies: The one-time or per annum dollar amount/value of 
management’s commitment, in response to OIG investigations, to utilize the 
government’s resources more efficiently
$3,931,416 
Restitutions: The dollar amount/value of restitutions resulting from OIG criminal 
investigations
$20,111,535 
Fines/Penalties: The dollar amount/value of fines, assessments, seizures, 
investigative/court costs, and other penalties resulting from OIG criminal 
investigations
$2,220,238 
Civil Monetary Actions: The dollar amount/value of forfeitures, settlements, 
damages, judgments, court costs, or other penalties resulting from OIG civil 
investigations
$1,884,241 
Total $31,627,614 
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OIG HOTLINE
The OIG Hotline provides a communication link between the OIG and persons who want 
to report alleged violations of laws, rules, and regulations; mismanagement; waste of 
funds; abuse of authority; or danger to public health and safety. During the reporting 
period October 1, 2007, through March 31, 2008, the OIG Hotline received a total of 
1,901 contacts. Of these, 1,849 were referred for further review and/or action. 
Complaints received (by method reported): 
Telephone 1,600
E-mail/Internet 146
Mail 102
Fax 53
Total 1,901
Contacts Received (by source): 
Complaints from Individuals or Nongovernmental Organizations  1,857
Complaints/Inquires from Congress 10
Referrals from GAO 8
Complaints from Other DOL Agencies 11
Incident Reports from DOL Agencies and Grantees  2
Referrals from OIG Components  5
Complaints from Other (non-DOL) Government Agencies  8
Total 1,901
Disposition of Complaints: 
Referred to OIG Components for Further Review and/or Action  70
Referred to DOL Program Management for Further Review and/or Action  1,183
Referred to Non-DOL Agencies/Organizations  596
No Referral Required/Informational Contact 52
Total 1,901
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